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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
An Analysis of Rural Community Development Corporation
Business Ventures: The Economic Performance of Selected
Manufacturing Ventures Originated Through Community
Resource Rationalization and Entrepreneurial Search
Initial anti-poverty efforts under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1 964 focused on
the provision of services such as education and legal and manpower training. The con-
cept of local control placed goal-setting, planning, and execution of programs within
the community. The emphasis shifted from the provision of services to community
economic development with the 1967 amendments which formalized the Special Im-
pact Program (SIP). The SIP was intended to make "appreciable impact" in reducing
dependency, unemployment, and community tensions, and to create permanent
benefits which would survive termination of government funding. Community con-
trol, which is basically more social or political than economic in nature, remained an
important concept of the new program.
The primary tool of the SIP is the Community Development Corporation (CDC), a
federally funded, locally controlled organization. The purpose of the CDC is to build
institutions and to develop the economy of its impact area. This study is concerned
generally with the economic development role of the CDC and specifically with its
basic method of economic development, the establishment of business ventures. CDCs
have established ventures in such business sectors as manufacturing, retailing, service,
and agriculture. The Office of Economic Development (OED) policy states that profit
maximization, rather than social or political objectives, should be the short-term ven-
ture goal.
Two basic approaches have been used by CDCs in venture establishment. The first
rationalizes community resources into a business venture with CDC investment (of
government granted funds) generally providing the initial equity. Control remains in
the community because the private sector is not usually a major financing source.
The second approach, entrepreneurial search, attempts to find an entrepreneur who
will invest personal funds and skills, augmented by CDC monetary investment, in a
venture to be located within the CDC impact area. Majority ownership, operation, and
management remain with the entrepreneur and, although community interests are
protected through contractual agreement, dilution of community control over its
development results.
The study compares the economic performance of selected manufacturing ventures
established in rural areas under the two approaches. Two ventures established through
each approach by Job Start Corporation, a Southeastern Kentucky CDC, and two
ventures established through community resource rationalization by Southwest
Virginia Community Development Fund, a CDC in Roanoke, are studied. The pur-
pose is to determine if performance differences exist between the ventures established
through the two approaches.
Primary sources of information included financial and other records at the CDC
sites and at the OED, Washington, D.C.
The entrepreneurial ventures are found to rely substantially on private sector fi-
nancing while the other firms rely much more on government financing for both
capital investment and operating expenses. The latter apparently stems partly from a
desire to avoid outside control which might accompany private sector financing.
A second difference is found in return on investment. The government contribution
to operating expenses has a positive effect on net income. This effect is greater for com-
munity resource rationalization ventures due to larger government contributions.
Removal of this subsidy would change profit to loss for all of these firms while affect-
ing entrepreneurial firms less.
The entrepreneurial ventures are found to create jobs and payroll at lesser cost to the
government, again because of greater reliance on private sector financing.
The relative performance of the ventures suggests that the entrepreneurial firms are
more consonant with the OED policy of venture profit maximization in the short-term
and the legislative intent that benefits created, e.g., ventures, should be permanent and
survive termination of government funding. Higher costs of community resource
rationalization may be attributed to the requirements of the community control con-
cept.
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In a collective sense, the United States is probably
the wealthiest nation in history. In a relative sense, the
individual citizen of the United States is among the wealthiest
in the world. The signs of wealth and conspicuous consumption
are present everywhere in this country. Yet, many of its
cities are suffering from the physical and psychological decay
of the very institutions and facilities which have made wide-
spread affluence possible. By contrast, many rural areas have
remained almost untouched by the advancing industrialization
upon which much of the wealth and income are based. To some,
this circumstance might be counted as a blessing, but to
others it is seen as an unnecessary inequity which can be
corrected through the concerted application of the nation's
resources.
Many government agencies are involved in the various
aspects of the national war on poverty, including the Small
Business Administration, the Economic Development Administra-
tion, the Appalachian Regional Commission, and the welfare
agencies. A primary governmental effort toward elimination
of pockets of poverty in this country is represented by the

Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and its amendments. The
Economic Opportunity Act established the Office of Economic
Opportunity (OEO) to administer and coordinate governmental
programs directed toward the elimination of poverty. This
report addresses the community economic development role of
the OEO and does not consider its other anti-poverty programs
or the lack of success of its efforts toward overall program
.... 2
coordination.
The initial plan of the OEO was to provide services
—
legal, educational, and manpower training, for example—to
the poor to help them join the mainstream of American life.
However, through the Rural and Small Business Loan programs
that were contained in the Act, the importance of economic
development was recognized. The Kennedy-Javits Amendments
of 1967 provided for Special Impact Funds (Title I-D) for
the combined social and economic development of inner cities.
These special programs were directed to the solution of the
critical problems existing in particular communities or
neighborhoods within urban areas having especially large
The title of the office was changed by the 1975
Amendments to Community Services Administration. Because the
literature and most documentation refer to the office as the
OEO, and because the bureaucracy still refers to the OEO,
that title is carried throughout this report.
2For a study of OEO efforts to achieve overall
program coordination, see H. J. Halley, "An Analysis and
Evaluation of the Office of Economic Opportunity National
Anti-poverty Planning Process" (DBA dissertation, The George
Washington University, 1971)-

3concentrations of low-income persons and within rural areas
having significant " out-migration " problems. The programs
were to be of sufficient size and scope to have an "appreciable
impact" in arresting tendencies toward dependency, chronic
unemployment, and rising community tensions.
Between 1967 and 1972, Title I-D funds provided for
the genesis of the Community Development Corporation (CDC).
The CDC was an outgrowth and a recognition of the fact that
services provided under the original 0E0 concept would not
break the cycle of poverty in deteriorated areas. Income
transfer and social service programs were described as
insufficient to solve the problems of poverty. Dignity,
self-pride, and some control over and participation in assis-
tance programs were essential. The interaction of these
intangible factors is readily apparent. The unique and
necessary ingredient, which only the CDCs offer, is a high
degree of genuine, visible, local community involvement in
both the formulation and the control of economic development
programs affecting the community. The problems of rural
and urban areas are interrelated in that the out-migration
from rural areas frequently swells the population of nearby
urban areas. It is essential that methods and programs be
developed to bring economic development to the people where
they live. A comprehensive program should deal with housing,
recreation, new businesses, new Jobs and job counseling, and

the environmental and physical community as well as the
organizing of activities. Because the CDCs are locally con-
ceived and operated, they are "both more flexible and more
responsive to community needs than are the more traditional
types of development institutions.
In 1972, a second Kennedy-Jav its amendment to the
Economic Opportunity Act of 196-4- combined the Title I-D
Special Impact Program and the Title III-A Rural Loan Programs
into a single operation: Community Economic Development,
Title VII. Its stated purpose was to encourage the develop-
ment of special programs "by which the residents of urban and
rural low-income areas could, through self-help and mobili-
zation of the community-at-large and with appropriate
federal assistance, improve the quality of their economic
and social participation in community life in such a way as
to contribute to the elimination of poverty and the establish-
ment of permanent economic and social benefits.
The Community Development Corporation
Community Development Corporations have been estab-
lished to launch and supervise commercial enterprises in
most areas of business, including manufacturing, retailing,
wholesaling, service trades, construction, and agriculture.
While not all CDCs or ventures have survived, a number show
significant economic promise.

The standard by which the performance and success of
the CDC and the CDC-sponsored venture should be measured is
still undefined. Testimony before the Senate subcommittee
considering amendments to the Economic Opportunity Act in 1971
strongly recommended that each CDC be allowed to develop its
own measurement criteria. The rationale given was that
every successful social effort has defined its own performance
criteria and measurements of progress. To be sure, community
economic development pursues multiple objectives, encompassing
economic, social, and political areas. As a result, agreement
on what to measure and how to measure it is most difficult
to achieve.
The Office of Economic Development (OED) policy
regarding the Special Impact Program indicates that, as a
general rule, CDC-established business ventures should have
profit maximization as a priority short-term goal. Profit
optimization remains a long-term goal. It follows, then,
that attainment of economic objectives should be the first
priority for the business ventures.
This does not ignore or relegate to secondary
importance the attainment of social or political objectives.
In accordance with the OED policy statement, institution-
building is the top priority of the Special Impact Program.
The institution-building role of the CDC is the primary
experimental feature of the Special Impact Program. By

inference, primary responsibility for this function rests
with the CDC itself, with its "business ventures in a
supportive but somewhat indirect role.
Approaches to Venture Establishment
In the selection and establishment of business
ventures, CDCs have generally employed two basic approaches:
entrepreneurial search and community resource rationalization.
Entrepreneurial search
Entrepreneurial search relies on finding an entrepre-
neur who is willing to invest money, management, and technical
skills in starting a business venture in an impact area under
the aegis of a CDC. Generally, there is also CDC investment
(of government granted funds) in the new business, sometimes
with the CDC having the controlling financial interest.
The Institute for New Enterprise Development (INED)
has developed a highly structured and organized procedure for
entrepreneurial search, the results of which have been used
by some CDCs. A three-weekend workshop with would-be
entrepreneurs helps them develop an understanding of their
own skills, motivation, and commitment. The emphasis is on
development of a management team, building on individual
strengths and compensating for individual weaknesses. INED
also maintains an extensive library of product and process
ideas from which the -entrepreneur can select, or against




provided in developing a business plan, generally for an annual
sales potential of over $1 million.
The INED has received funding from OED to support its
efforts in "bringing CDCs together with qualified entrepreneurs.
However, the general approach to entrepreneurial search and
identification is of interest to this study rather than the
specific IKED approach or commitment.
Community resource
rationalization
Under community resource rationalization, the CDC
surveys the resources and needs of the community and the poten-
tial of the projected market area. A business venture is then
established which rationalizes these resources into a viable




A combination of the two basic approaches to venture
establishment is a third, obvious possibility. A fourth
possibility is the acquisition of an existing business.
However, in the context of this study, acquisition is not
considered an addition to economic development. It may
prevent further deterioration and maintain a base for further
development, but it does not necessarily provide a net gain
to community product or job opportunities.
-1
-
"Community resource rationalization" is a term origi-
nated in this research to describe a particular CDC approach to
venture establishment and community economic development.

8The two basic approaches reflect substantive
philosophical differences as well as the procedural vari-
ations noted above. The most important of these relates
to the concept of community control. Early anti-poverty
programs ran headlong into the desire of the community to
control its own development. This desire was fueled by the
lack of success of programs thrust on communities from
outside, despite the wealth of good intentions with which
they were accompanied. The reliance upon community resource
rationalization will leave the community in control of its
programs. The introduction of an entrepreneur who will
generally want operational control is not consonant with
complete community control. It matters not that the entre-
preneur contributes to the business in a substantive way
through investment of talent and capital; it still represents
a dilution of community control.
If the performance of entrepreneurial ventures can
be demonstrated as superior, then there are economic costs
associated with strict adherence to the community control
concept. This factor should then receive clear and explicit
recognition in the decision-making process leading to
venture establishment, not as "good" or "bad," but simply
as an additional element which must be considered. Although
some empirical studies of CDCs have been accomplished, they
do not include a comparison of ventures established under
the two approaches.

CDCs Selected for the Study-
Two rural CDCs were selected for this study. The
first, the Job Start Corporation (JSC), is located in South-
eastern Kentucky and has utilized both basic approaches to
venture establishment. Four JSC ventures, two utilizing 'each
approach, contribute to the basic data for the study. The
second CDC, the Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund
(SVCDE), is located in Roanoke, Virginia, and has utilized
the community resource rationalization approach almost
exclusively. Two SVCDE ventures contribute to the basic data
for this study.
Purpose of the Study and
Expected Results
The purpose of this study is to examine and compare
two sets of CDC ventures, each established under a different
concept. It is expected that differences in performance can
be identified and attributed to the approach used in estab-
lishment. The results are expected to show that the ventures
established through entrepreneurial search will demonstrate
less reliance on government funding, generally better
profitability, and greater consonance with the OED
policy of venture profit maximization. These ventures
are also expected to show better promise of becoming inde-





Although the stated OED policy requires a goal of
venture profit maximization, social responsibility and
institution-building are still important to the overall
program. However, the latter functions are the primary
responsibility of the CDC itself and should be accomplished
without jeopardizing the venture's future. It follows,
then, that ventures should be established under conditions
which will maximize performance. An empirical study of
the two approaches has not been made to determine whether
performance differences exist.
The issue is particularly important at this time.
Most of the entrepreneurial searches which have successfully
arranged the marriage of a qualified entrepreneur and a
CDC in venture establishment have been conducted by the
IKED. A nonprofit organization, INED has developed a
highly organized and structured approach to the identifica-
tion of entrepreneurial talent.
It is not, however, the IRED program which is of
interest to this study but the general concept represented
by the INED approach which systematically identifies
qualified entrepreneurs and brings them together with the
CDC in a joint venture. The OED has tentatively decided
to reduce its support of IKED in fiscal year 1976 and
eliminate it completely in 1977? leaving it to the CDC to
enlist the aid of INED if it is desired.
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If the entrepreneurial ventures can be shown to
enjoy better performance, then the decision not to support
entrepreneurial search at the OED level is not consonant
with the OED policy regarding venture profit goals. For
this reason, the study is of immediate interest and could
have substantial influence on the Special Impact Program.
As reported in the Abt Associates Special Impact
Program Evaluation (reviewed in chapter III), manufacturing
ventures account for 38 percent of those established by rural
GDCs, and 40 to 100 percent of the CDC capital investment.
For the Job Start Corporation, investment in manufacturing
activities has accounted for 57 percent of all CDC expendi-
ture and 92 percent of all venture investment. For the
Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund, investment
in manufacturing activities has accounted for 56 percent of
all CDC expenditures and 89 percent of all venture investment
It is obvious that the efficiency and performance of
manufacturing ventures is of paramount importance to the
rural CDCs in this study. The Abt Associates Evaluation
indicates that manufacturing venture performance and
efficiency is of similar importance to most rural CDCs.
Primary Research Question
The primary research question in this study is:
Are there differences in the economic performance of
rural Community Development Corporation manufacturing
ventures established through the entrepreneurial search





The subsidiary research questions to be considered
are:
1. Are there differences in the generation of private
source investment capital and debt financing?
2. Are there differences in profit-income performance
and elapsed time from inception or startup to
break-even?
3. Are there differences in the cost to the government
per job created?
4. Are there differences in direct community economic
benefits per dollar of government funding received?
Scope
This study examines the performance of newly established
manufacturing ventures in rural areas by rural CDCs to the
extent indicated in the research questions. Benefits derived
from manufacturing ventures are more likely to be net additions
to the local economy than are retail, service, or other
activities. New manufacturing activities are specified because
few presently exist in undeveloped rural areas which might
provide opportunities for acquisition. Additionally, this
study orientation specifically recognizes the importance of
new manufacturing activities to the rural CDC developmental
strategy as indicated by the relative expenditure of rural CDC
funds and efforts. Six ventures are examined: two established
through entrepreneurial search and four established through
community resource rationalization.
1See pp. 11 and 52.

13
Theoretical Framework and Methodology
Definition of Variables
Independent variables
The two basic approaches to business venture estab-
lishment— entrepreneurial search and community resource
rationalization— are designated the independent variables.
These are further defined as applying to rural areas under
rural CDCs and to manufacturing ventures with labor intensive
characteristics. Each of the areas selected for study has
adequate access to the market, raw materials, and transpor-
tation, and there is a sufficient, though unskilled,
labor pool. A basic assumption is that the areas and
ventures involved in the study are similar in geography,
labor, transportation, sector of activity (manufacturing),
and the general availability of government or other funding.
Differences in performance are due to the ability of the
firm to cope with management problems, which in turn are
attributable to the approach used in establishment.
Dependent variables
The indicators of economic performance contained






The research model is designed to provide direction
and purpose to the research as it is performed. Three
elements of the community economic development program,




The background, history, institutional framework,
and functions and purposes of the actors in the community
development program are presented as found in its legislative





The CDC is the prime agent through which capital,
labor, and skills are rationalized within, or introduced
from without, the community in venture establishment. In
business venture establishment, CDCs have generally used two
substantively different approaches: entrepreneurial search
and community resource rationalization. This study examines
the two approaches as used in the establishment of manu-
facturing business ventures, focusing on differences in
performance.
Goals and objectives
While community development has a community
infrastructure-building objective as well as the objective

15
of economic base construction, only the latter is addressed
as a goal in this study. The primary vehicle in such
construction is the manufacturing venture. The setting is
rural.
The research model may be visualized as indicated
in' figure 1.
Venture Selection
Both CDC sites selected for this study are in rural
areas and have a preponderance of manufacturing ventures
among their activities. Other activities include real estate
development and community organizing. Ventures selected
include four from the Job Start Corporation (JSC) and two
from the Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund (SVCDF)
Two of the JSC ventures were established through entrepre-
neurial search and two through community resource rationali-




The Outdoor Venture Corporation (OVC), a manufacturer
of low-priced, medium-quality camping tents and accessories,
was formed in 1972 through partnership between an entre-
preneur and the JSC. The entrepreneurs were located through
the efforts of a Knoxville, Tennessee, consulting firm and








































Phoenix Products, Incorporated, is a manufacturer
of fiberglass kayaks and is located in Tyner, Kentucky.
It was formed in 1973 through partnership between an entre-
preneur and the JSC. The principals were brought together
through an IKED workshop.
Community resource
rationalization ventures
Lawson Furniture was started in 1971 by the Knox
County CDC, which is affiliated with the JSC. Products
include both upholstered and non-upholstered furniture.
It is located in Barbourville, Kentucky.
Possom Trot Corporation (PTC) was founded in 1971
as four separate divisions of the JSC. It was located in
four different sites in southeastern Kentucky. Its major
products currently are stuffed toy animals. A metal
division did exist briefly to make campers for mounting on
truck bodies. Other products have included mini-barns.
The Gainsboro Electrical Manufacturing Company
(GEMCO) began operations in September 1970, under SVCDF.
Located in Roanoke, Virginia, its primary product is
electrical wiring harnesses.
The Botetourt Cabinet Corporation (BCC) is a
kitchen-cabinet manufacturer which began operations in




Figure 2 shows the relative ages and- life spans of
the six firms, together with their fiscal years, the
sponsoring CDC, and the approach used in their establishment.
Data Collection
Venture financial and other data were gathered in
two separate on-site visits to each CDC-venture location.
Interviews, financial statements, and activity files were
all important information sources. Additional data were
obtained at the OED offices in Washington, D.C., including
the Quarterly Monitoring Reports submitted by each CDC to
OED. Interviews and correspondence files were also
important data sources. Two visits to the IKED, Belmont,
Massachusetts, provided valuable insight into the procedures
and problems of entrepreneurial search.
Analysis
The data were arranged to facilitate comparison of
the activity and performance of the six ventures at comparable
venture ages. This arrangement permitted an examination and
comparison of trends as they developed. The basic method
of comparison was through the calculation of various ratios
for each venture. This procedure resulted in an ordinal
valuation of differences. It does not attempt to quantify
the differences through interval or ratio valuation.
For a discussion of concept quantification, see
Paul D. Reynolds, A Primer in Theory Construction (Indianapo-
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The procedure of direct comparison of- ratios was
selected because of the unavailability of adequate data from
industries represented by the ventures. Available data are
aggregated at such a level as to obscure meaningful relation-
ships among individual firms of small size (assets or sales
volume), or among firms representing secondary activity lines.
Additionally, the ventures in this study are relatively young,
and the available data make no provision for the relative
ages of firms which contribute to the overall data aggregation,
Efforts were made to obtain specific data from representative
trade associations on the manufacturing lines represented by
the six firms. In each instance, the efforts were rebuffed
and the data described as proprietary. None of the seven
associations contacted had data relating performance to the
age of the firm.
Limitations
The small number of firms in the comparison and their
short life spans represents a limitation. No attempt is made,
however, to establish precise differences. The results
indicate that substantial performance variation is generally
present in the comparisons selected for study, so that some
of the concern regarding correct ordinal valuation is
dissipated. Although extension of the generalization requires
caution, the results do provide some insight into economic
performance and trends. This should prove to be of value to
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Special Impact Program administrators in the evaluation of
venture establishment proposals by the CDCs.
Organization of the Study
The organization of this study follows closely the
research model presented earlier.
Chapter II defines community development and describes
the community setting in which it occurs (rural or urban)
as controlling its thrust and direction. Community control
is discussed, both pro and con, and is related as a concept
to some of the difficulties and setbacks experienced by early
anti-poverty programs. The CDC is discussed as a vehicle
of change but one which suffers. many problems resulting
from conflicting political, economic, and social objectives.
The relative problems of rural and urban settings are
related to investment strategies. Finally, the OED policy
regarding venture profit goals is discussed.
Studies related to the present research are discussed
in chapter III. The greatest difficulty in assessing poverty
program success or failure is the inability to define
measurement criteria. Suggested criteria are discussed as
well as criticism of those used. Two important studies of
the Special Impact Program have been conducted. The first
of these examined the 1968 endeavors, and the second
extended over the three-year period ending in 1973- The




to satisfy the congressionally mandated requirement for
periodic evaluation. It was a massive effort, costing the
government Si -87 million, and was poorly received.
Chapters IV and V present case studies of the two
CDCs selected for this study—the Job Start Corporation and
the Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund—along with
a "brief description of the ventures included in the study.
Venture establishment procedures and evolving attitudes
toward venture selection, establishment, and profitability
provide a specific philosophic, geographic, and demographic
setting for the analysis which follows in chapter VT. The
analysis compares the performance of the ventures selected.
A summary, conclusions, and recommendations for





Community development conveys a number of different
meanings. In the larger sense, it encompasses a whole range
of activities such as political, social, and economic.
Within a narrower definition, it may designate economic
activity as the primary catalyst of community change, antici-
pating that social and political activity and change will be
resultants of economic activity. Community development has
been described as a process, method, program, and movement.
But, whatever the individual persuasion regarding the
definition, the theoretical constructs of community develop-
ment require community control. However, the degree of
control found in successful developmental efforts varies
widely. Some practitioners would add the requirement for
local ownership of development efforts, such as business
ventures. The enabling legislation encourages "maximum feasible
participation" of residents in developmental efforts.
In this chapter the concepts of community development
and community economic development are explored so that the
philosophy of venture establishment through entrepreneurial




in perspective. If the concept of total community control
is accepted and required, then the entrepreneurial search
approach is not completely in consonance with the conventional
wisdom of community development. Because of its importance
to the present research, the concept of community control is
examined and views for and against are presented. Community
control seems also to be the hinge upon which initial
development under the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 swung,
providing an explanation for the evolution from community
efforts emphasizing political and social change to efforts
emphasizing economic efforts. The Community Development
Corporation (CDC) is examined as a primary tool of economic
development under the amendments to the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964. Finally, the stated policy of the Office of
Economic Development with regard to CDCs and CDC-established
business ventures is examined.
The legislative history of the Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964, as amended, is an integral part of the conceptual
evolution. As such, it is not examined separately but will
be introduced into the discussion as necessary.
In this chapter, the focus is narrowed from the broad
concepts of community development and the concepts of
community control to the primary tool of such development, the
CDC. In chapters IV and V, the discussion is narrowed








One of the greatest difficulties in defining community
development stems from the fact that it involves relation-
ships among individuals and groups of individuals. Both
definition and implementation are further complicated by the
fact that the sense of community or neighborhood is dis-
appearing. If the community is defined as a local society
and the institutions with which the residents identify
themselves, then the problem of attaining concerted and
cooperative action to develop a community is brought into
2perspective. The crux of community development is that
people must act collectively to improve the situation of
the group and thereby the individual.
The interdependence of economic and social develop-
ment frequently results in conflict in process if not in
W. W. and L. J. Biddle, The Community Development
Process: The Rediscovery of Local" Initiative (New York: Holt,




W. J. Hayes, "The Problem of Community Intelli-
gence," International Review of Community Development 10
(1962): 155.
^Irwm T. Sanders, "The Concept of Community
Development," in Community Development as a Process , ed.




goal. Industrial development is dependent, in part, on
the formation of an administrative or bureaucratic organi-
zation to link technology, production, and marketing. The
ultimate results
—
<jobs, income, and readily available
consumer goods—are acceptable goals. However, the process
may be costly in a social sense. This is another factor
which inhibits agreement on the definition and implementation
of community development.
Sanders has defined community development in four
ways: as a process, as a method, as a program, and as a
movement.
As a process . The emphasis is on a series of changes
as measured against selected criteria, primarily social
relations. A supporting definition is provided by the
United States International Cooperation Administration:
A process of social action in which the people of a
community organize themselves for planning and action;
define their common and individual needs and problems;
make group and individual plans with a maximum reli-
ance upon community resources; and supplement these
resources when necessary with services and materials
from governmental and non-governmental agencies outside
the community.
2
While this definition emphasizes changes in social rela-
tionships, it appears that the measurement criteria could
1Ibid., pp. 18-27.
2U.S., International Cooperation Administration,
"Community Development Guidelines," Community Development
Review 3 (December, 1956): 1.
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be expanded to include certain financial or economic impact
criteria such as those indicated in chapter VI.
As a method . A variation of the process definition
which guides a process for a particular purpose determined
as useful in the judgment of the administrator. Economic
development through business establishment might be the
method, while measurement of progress might be by economic
criteria.
As a program . Adding content or activities to the
method moves closer to community development. This concept,
as defined, however, focuses more squarely on specific areas
such as health, welfare, industry, or agriculture. When
community control factors of the process definition are super-
imposed on the program definition, the result appears to
provide a fairly accurate description of the CDC. The CDC
offers a program formulated, planned, and implemented under
community control, guided by managerial, technical (staff
or consultant), and financial assistance. These are then
integrated with community resources into a community economic
development program.
As a movement . For some practitioners, community
development involvement carries with it an emotional commit-
ment. Progress and success are viewed with reference to a
set of values and goals which may not lend themselves to





In the course of the research for this study, the
writer frequently heard the community development corporation
referred to as the "CDC movement" by both government
administrators and CDC staff members. Halley reported that
the Bureau of the Budget described OEO's needs as "being
for bright young men having a social rather than a physical
science orientation." Perhaps that appraisal of need is
actually reflected in the attitudes of those involved in
the federal community development program.
Biller's definition of development provides a
summary to this portion of the discussion. He defines
development as that process by which the adaptation or
problem solving capacity of any unit is increased. Develop-
ment is process-oriented rather than content- oriented and
is thus distinguished from the concepts of modernization.
Modernization refers to the symbols, products, or modes of
life associated with modernity. Development emphasizes
what is being learned through the problem-solving process
rather than the content, which includes the symbols of
2
modernity.
A weakness in this definition is that progress toward
development becomes difficult to measure and measurement
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criteria difficult to define. As will "be shown later, agree-
ment on measurement criteria for the Special Impact Program
has not been attained. Proponents of the process definition
tend to resist measurement through what Biller describes as
products or symbols of modernity but offer few measurement
alternatives. In short, the process definition appears to
be too limited in scope to be useful in a practical sense.
The definition of development as applied to the community
should be extended to encompass those symbols of modernity
as indicators of the ability to learn through problem-solving
techniques. The strategy or methods are also of practical
importance. Community development includes process, content,
and method.
The Community Setting
Community development is a method of facilitating
change. Change, however, is a phenomenon which is occurring
at all times in all places. Technology, industrial growth,
communication, and the resulting rising expectations are
symbolic of change. It is the varying rate of change and
the uneven distribution of change and its effects, both
"good" and "bad," which result in perpetuation or widening
of developmental differences. Community development is
designed to narrow these differences and to take advantage
of those resultants perceived as "good" and to mitigate the
effects of those resultants perceived as "bad. " The relative
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community development, described by Warren as "more-developed"
or "less-developed, " determines the specific developmental
emphasis and strategy desired.
More-developed . A large American city and its
metropolitan area provide an example of the more-developed
setting. Well-developed institutional structures are found
in industry, labor, health, education, product distribution
systems, and government. These structures are the result of
change and bring with them a host of problems which are
perceived as "bad. " Examples of these are deteriorating
inner cities accompanied by flight to the suburbs and an
eroding tax base, deteriorating public services, lack of
housing, crime, underemployment, and unemployment. Community
development in this instance is designed to mitigate the
effects of change and to improve its distribution. Resident
control of community development is particularly important
in more-developed areas in order to cope with lack of
ownership of community resources; for example, housing,
land, and businesses. As will be shown later in this chapter,
however, community control can introduce problems as well.
Less-developed . The Appalachian region of South-
eastern Kentucky and the rural areas surrounding Roanoke,
1
R. L. Warren, "The Context of Community Develop-
ment," in Community Development as a Process
,
ed. Lee J.




Virginia, are typical of less-developed areas of the United
States. Community development in these areas is primarily
designed to bring change to, or increase the rate of change
in, the area. The problem of coping with existing structural
institutions and accompanying effects is present but to a
lesser degree. Primary emphasis is on the development of
an industry base to provide employment and income in an area
where few industry-related resources exist.
In both the more- and less-developed areas, private
businesses are reluctant to invest or locate. This is a
void which the federal government has filled only partially
through financing the Community Development Corporation.
Blaustein provides a summary for the concepts of
community and community economic development while intro-
ducing the concept of community control. He characterizes
community economic development as including Jobs, income,
and community ownership while promoting participation of
the poor (in groups and as individuals) in every aspect of
the capital-generating power of the economy. Among the
specific goals are jobs and job improvement, career develop-
ment, increased responsibility and numbers of managers from
the poor, and provision of capital and technical assistance
to community owned businesses, together with leverage
opportunities. Blaustein characterizes the government as
the prime mover in creating a favorable economic base for

32
all residents. The ultimate key is political power, but
that must be preceded by the development of economic
1power.
Bergsman seconds the need for involvement of the
poor in decision and control. Jobs are important but by
themselves are not enough. Control of institutions which
have large stakes in relevant decisions will force the
influence of these institutions to be arrayed with the
2
community and its interests.
Community Control
Community control implies the power to govern
existing resources and the rationalization of these
resources in the community development effort. It includes
control of the planning, implementation, and administration
of such an effort. Necessary resources may be found either
within or outside the community, but would be controlled by
the community in the satisfaction of needs perceived by the
community.
Community control is a concept that is important
to community development and community economic development.
In this section community control is discussed first from
Arthur I. Blaustein, "What Is Community Economic
Development?" Urban Affairs Quarterly 6 (September, 1970)
57-69.
2Joel Bergsman, "Alternatives to the Non-Gilded
Ghetto: Notes on Different Goals and Strategies," Public
Policy 19 (Spring, 1971): 315-
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the standpoint of its advocates and then from the standpoint
of those who are critical of such control and consider it
pivotal in the evolution toward an economic emphasis in
community development. The CDC is the most direct example
of tools utilized in the federally financed Community Economic
Development program. It should be recognized that the degree
of community control represents a central philosophical
difference between the establishment of ventures through
community resource rationalization or through entrepreneurial
search.
Goodenough raises the basic question of how an
objective can be accomplished without respecting community
wants. If the objective is simply to create new conditions
to which people must adjust, then community control is
unnecessary. If the way the community chooses to react
is important, or if community residents are to undertake
the change, then what the community wants and how the plan
fits those wants can mean the difference between success
and failure. Where the emphasis is on what planners want,
the wants of the community will limit what can be achieved.
Conversely, where emphasis is on the wants of the people,
then the wants of the planners may limit achievement.
Faux states that community control is an essential
ingredient to effective economic development in poverty
¥. H. Goodenough, Cooperation in Change (New York:





areas. Experience with urban renewal and anti-poverty programs
such as manpower training and Model Cities has shown that
program control determines the incidence of program "benefits.
If poor residents are to receive the benefits of poverty
area economic stimulation, then poor residents must be in
control. Faux specifically attributes the problems of the
central cities to an imbalance of political and economic
ppower rather than to immutable economic forces.
Rosenbloom lists control by residents as one of the
criteria for the successful marriage of government and
business m the community economic development effort.
Perry concludes from both the civil rights and poverty
experience that instruments of action must be controlled by
the neighborhood alone. Neighborhood political power rests
on economic power deriving from control of existing and
newly created economic institutions. Improvement of social,
4-
political, and economic status depends on neighborhood action.
Geoffrey Faux, "Politics and Bureaucracy in Community
Controlled Economic Development," haw and Contemporary Prob-
lems J6 (Spring 1971): 277-78.
2Geoffrey Faux, "Background Paper," in CDC's New
Hope for the Inner City , Report of the Twentieth Century
Fund's Task Force on Community Development Corporations
(New York, 1971), p. 23.
R. S. Rosenbloom, "Business Technology and the Urban
Crisis, " in Social Innovation in the City , ed. R. S. Rosen-
bloom and Robin Marris (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University
Press, 1969), pp. 58-60.
4-
Stewart E. Perry, "National Policy and the Community




Ackerson and Sharf observe that ultimate control
of a community development corporation by the community
increases the probability of community identification with
the corporation and subsequent support and participation
in its activities.
In a slightly different reference to community
control, Vietorisz and Harrison suggest that CDC performance,
for refunding purposes, be judged on self-defined success
criteria rather than on criteria of a government funding
2
agency or financial investor. This would presumably
preclude the imposition of some criteria by the bureaucracy,
a procedure which could result in a form of outside
control.
Hetherington' s comments are representative of the
opposite position. He sees the call for community ownership
and control as a reaction to an economic system which has
allowed poverty pockets to develop. The system which has
allowed decay cannot be expected to correct the situation.
His view is that there is nothing in the current performance
of community controlled development that indicates that this
is the way to promote economic growth and reverse the process
of decay. The critical ingredient of the war on poverty is
Nels J. Ackerson and Lawrence H. Sharf, "Community
Development Corporations: Operations and Financing," Harvard
Law Review 85 (May, 1970): 1578.
2Thomas Vietorisz and Bennett Harrison, "Ghetto
Development, Community Corporations and Public Policy,"
Review of Black Political Economy 2 (Fall, 1971): 37-

56
money and strict adherence to the concept of- community control
and ownership discourages investment from outside, precluding
the rationalization of all resources necessary to economic
growth. This is in direct support of the entrepreneurial
search approach to business venture establishment and questions
complete reliance on community resource rationalization.
The legislative history indicates that even the
Congress has retreated from full support of the concept of
community control. The original Economic Opportunity Act of
1964- (EOA) tends to support community control as the intent
of Congress. However, subsequent amendments to the EOA,
when considered in the light of early experience with anti-
poverty programs, indicate that community control was not
altogether successful or, perhaps, totally desirable.
In his 1964- message on poverty to Congress, President
Johnson described the EOA as providing every American com-
munity the opportunity to develop a comprehensive plan to
fight its own poverty and supplying help in implementing the
community plan. The plans were not to be imposed by
Washington but would be prepared by each community in the
2light of its own problems and needs. Title II of the EOA,
J. A. C. Hetherington, "Community Participation:
A Critical View," Law and Contemporary Problems $6 (Winter,
1971): 33-3^.
p
U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare, The War on Poverty: The Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, A compilation of materials relevant to S. 2642 prepared
for the Select Subcommittee on Poverty, 88th Cong. , 2d sess.
,
July 23, 1964, pp. 2-3.
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Urban and Rural Community Action Programs, provided that
such activities were to "be developed, conducted and
administered with the maximum feasible participation of
residents of the areas and members of the groups [assisted]."
This provision has survived the several amendments to the
Act.
The Special Impact Program Amendments to the EOA
(Title I-D, 1966, superseded by Title VII, 1972) contain
similar provisions. Title "VTI specifies that residents are to
develop programs for economic and social participation in
community life through self-help and mobilization of community
resources. A Community Development Corporation, funded under
Title "VTI, must have at least half of its board of directors
2drawn from among area residents.
Kotler views the concept of local control and community
action, as indicated in the EOA, as leading to the organiza-
tion of the poor as a political force. While most political
forces have a special interest which provides cohesion and
motivation, the community organization of poor residents had
a "sovereign base" quite unlike that of special interest
groups. The base was territorially organized citizen interest
and the pressures which materialized were quite different
from those normally exerted by special interest groups.
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, As Amended, U.S.
Code , vol. 42, sec. 2781 (1972). !





Moreover, the newly formed organizations were quite willing
to use their influence to challenge the authority and power
of established municipal government forms. The federal
government was seen by heads of local governments as
indirectly sponsoring this challenge.
In response to mayoral complaints, the Green Amend-
ment to the EOA was passed in 1967, allowing mayors to gain
control over anti-poverty efforts within their cities.
This action resulted in withdrawal of funds to some local
organizations which challenged local government, and
permitted the emphasis to shift away from political activity
to community economic development.
According to Kotler, the new policy was designed to
encourage the poor to join the existing system while removing
support for the confrontation of established municipal
power. Assistance would be provided to those who wanted
to establish small businesses to employ the disadvantaged.
While the complete demise of political activity could not
be expected, the emphasis on business venture and the creation
of an economic base would result in political activity more
consonant with conventional rules of special interest
2
politics. ' The Special Impact Program and the Community
-•-Ibid., sees. 2790, 2791, 2795, 2796 (1967), Green
Amendment
.
2Milton Kotler, "The Politics of Community Economic




Development Corporation were viewed as having resulted from
reaction to the political activity of community organizations
and served as the vehicle for community economic development.
,
Moynihan describes the period of local organization-
political establishment confrontation somewhat more directly.
Neither of the simultaneous but disparate goals of program
coordination and political activism were achieved, and in
the process of attempting achievement, "all hell broke loose
all over the place." Not only did the organization-
establishment confrontation result in domination by the
established political power base, but also internal struggles
among would-be organization leaders diminished any possible
organizational effectiveness. Moynihan observes that the
effective exercise of power is learned through apprentice-
ship and training. The results of thrusting power on an
individual or group are painful to observe. For example,
elections for Community Action Program board members from
among area residents drew miniscule turnouts. Frequent
quarrels among board members reflected a basic lack of
understanding of the difference between policy and adminis-
tration, between substance and procedure. Therefore, progress
was slow and difficult. Militancy was substituted for reason.
The results of such maximum feasible participation were not
2
encouraging.
Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding









Perry provides a somewhat different perspective on
the genesis of the CDC and the shift in emphasis to community
economic development. The initial programs in the EOA were
largely service programs: Job Corps, work-training and work-
study programs, VTSTA, and Head Start. The Community Action
Program, which provided for the funding of community organi-
zations, was designed to mobilize the resources of the
community for the development of these service programs.
The poor and other residents were to serve on boards which
would direct the programs and apply pressures as deemed
necessary to obtain a larger, more equitable division of
available services. Perry indicates, however, that poverty
is not so much a problem of individuals as it is of areas.
The Special Impact Program Amendments to the EOA seem to
support this position by recognizing the need to break the
cycle of poverty in deteriorating areas. The problem of
poverty is so complex that solutions have to contain a
coordinated development program including, but not limited
to, services provided for the individual. A substantial
emphasis is required on the building of businesses with
resulting jobs and income for residents. Financing such
development in all poverty areas would require funding far
in excess of that considered politically feasible. This
factor, coupled with the idea of "special impact," implied
a limitation on the number of areas that could be funded
in order that "appreciable impact in arresting tendencies
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toward dependency, chronic unemployment and community-
deterioration" could be achieved in the areas selected.
The Special Impact Program is a multifaceted program
including housing, "business, and other development projects.
But the emphasis is on economic development and on the Jobs
2
and income created thereby.
whether the CDC and economic-based community develop-
ment emerged in direct response to the inadequacies of the
services approach to the problems of the poor or to political
activism on the part of community organizations is signifi-
cant to this study in an historical sense only. What is
important is that "the principle of community control and
institution building remain important aspects of CDC
philosophy. However, the emphasis is on economic improvement,
and CDC activities go well beyond the provision of services
as contained in the early legislation. The CDC is a primary
tool of community economic development. The following section
will provide background, objectives, and problems of the
CDCs and their operations.
The Community Development Corporation
Background
The CDC was formally recognized in a 1966 amendment to




vol. 42, sec. 2982 (1972).
Stewart E. Perry, "Federal Support for CDCs: Some
of the History and Issues of Community Control," Review of
Black Political Economy 3 (Spring, 1973): 18-20.
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Javits. It was "based on a model developed through the
efforts of Senator Kennedy to improve the conditions in the
Bedford-Stuyvesant ghetto area of New York City. Business,
financial, and community leaders were brought together to
funnel financial, managerial, and technical resources into
the area. The amendment became known as Title I-D to the
EOA and established the Special Impact Program (SIP). Its
purpose was stated as follows:
. . . establishment of special programs which (1) are
dedicated to the solutions of critical problems exist-
ing in particular communities or neighborhoods (defined
without regard to political or other subdivisions or
boundaries; within those urban areas having especially
large concentrations of low-income persons, and within
those rural areas having substantial out-migration to
urban areas; and (2) are of . sufficient size and scope
to have an appreciable impact on such communities and
neighborhoods in arresting tendencies toward dependency,
chronic unemployment and rising community tensions.
1
In its first year, the SIP was administered by the
Department of Labor, which used $18 million of a $25 million
total expenditure for an employment training program. In
1967, Congress indicated its dissatisfaction with the manpower
training approach by rewriting Title I-D to emphasize its
community economic development intent.
A detailed design of the program beyond the general
mandate of community economic development was not specified
by Congress. In fiscal year 1968, three federal agencies
provided program models for implementation of the SIP:
1U.S. Code, vol. 42, sec. 2763 (1966).
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1. The Department of Labor proposed grants to outside
agencies for expansion and relocation/
2. The Economic Development Administration model involved
the business community much as the Bedford-Stuyvesant
effort had, but ignored community involvement and
control.
3. The 0E0 model reflected the present orientation of
community involvement and control of local efforts
in coordination with business and other community
programs.
1
In fiscal year 1969, administrative responsibility
and control of the SIP was transferred completely to 0E0,
and its model, described above, became the operational model
for community economic development. Subsequent amendments
to the EOA in 1972 and 1975 reinforced the role of the CDC
as a primary tool of the program. In 1972, Title I-D was
2
replaced by a new Title VII, Community Economic Development.
Title VII was amended again in 1975- There are three
operational parts in the current Title VII, with the
following general provisions:
1. Part A (Special Impact Programs). Part A focuses
more sharply on urban and rural-based corporations,
emphasizing the role of federally supplied equity
capital and encourages the cooperation of other
federal agencies in assisting CDCs.3
2. Part B (Rural Programs). Part B provides grants
to low-income farm families and rural cooperatives.
4
National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, "Community
Development Corporations: A Review of Their Experiences"
(Draft) (Washington, D.C., 1973), pp. 82-86. (Mimeographed.)
2U.S. Code
, vol. 42, sees. 2981-85 (1972).
5Ibid., sec. 2982 (1975).




5. Part C (Training and Technical Assistance). Part C
makes available technical assistance and long-term
loans to CDCs and cooperatives directly or in
cooperation with banks or other organizations.
1
The CDC is defined by Part A as a non-profit, locally
initiated organization. The area it serves may or may not
follow established political or other subdivisions, and may be
rural or urban, but will have concentrations of low-income
persons. The program in each area will be of sufficient size
to' have an appreciable impact in arresting tendencies toward
dependency, chronic unemployment, and community deterioration
and will show promise of survival upon termination of federal
assistance. Finally, the CDC will be assisted in starting
businesses to provide employment and ownership for area
residents through local planning and implementation. However,
the government (0E0) retains the authority to approve ventures
established with government funds. The ultimate goal is the
establishment of permanent economic and social benefits in
2the area.
Goals and Objectives
Individuals who come together to form an organization
are the product of their own background, experience, and
perception. Perhaps the most vexing problem faced by such
a group of individuals is the setting of goals and objectives
1Ibid., sec. 2984.
2Ibid., sees. 2981, 2981a, 2982a.
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for the organization. Such is certainly the case when indi-
viduals face the problem of forming a CDC for the purpose
of fostering community economic development. Complicating
the situation further is the fact that the CDC represents a
multifaceted approach to the problems of the community.
Disagreement over priorities is inevitable.
Goals sought by CDCs have been generally categorized
as follows:
1. Local community control over the means and instru-
ments of development
2. Comprehensive economic development, which can also
provide for no. J
3. Social goals, by tempering economic considerations
with social considerations.!
Central to each of these goals are economic consider-
ations. Acceptance of that point leads to an examination
of each goal relative to economic considerations and the
question of compatibility with social and political goals.
Political goals center around community control of
economic resources and social services, coupled with broad-
based community involvement in the decision process. As
has been demonstrated, however, community control can result
in challenge to established governmental forms even before
an economic base has been established. Additionally, one
of the stated objectives of the SIP is to establish
National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs,
"Community Development Corporations," p. 15-
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permanent economic and social benefits in the area which
show promise of survival upon termination of federal funding,
This implies the need to attract outside sources of funding
in addition to federal assistance. Few poverty areas would
be able to "go it alone" without either, or both, federal'
and private sources of funding and capital. It is quite
common for outside investors to place restrictions on the
use of funds, managerial qualifications, and types of
investments made. Acceptance of such restrictions dilutes
community control; rejection limits available resources.
It appears, then, that the extreme of absolute
community control may be an unnecessary limiting factor
and incompatible with maximum community development, an
economic goal. The experience of one CDC which accepted
a protected minority position at the expense of some control
will be outlined in chapter IV.
The conflict between economic and social goals may
be demonstrated in a similar manner. If social services
are to be provided by the CDC, profits generated by estab-
lished business ventures provide one source of financing.
If profits are not generated, termination of federal funding
to the CDC may signal the end of the CDC and funds available
for social goal achievement. Sturdivant views the primary
objective of CDCs as the establishment of self-sufficient,
Frederick D. Sturdivant, "Community Development
Corporations: The Problem of Mixed Objectives," Law and
Contemporary Problems 36 (Winter, 1971): 44—47.
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viable enterprises capable of attracting needed financial
technical and managerial resources. Broader social goals
must be considered longer range in nature. Faux observes
that most CDC leaders view self-sufficiency as the generation
of sufficient income to make the CDC independent of political
strings attached to gifts and grants. Faux goes on to say
that realization of economic and social goals rests on the
ability of the CDCs to survive as a business or to produce
2businesses that survive.
Perry states that the central and immediate goal
of community economic development is to create power and
influence by providing economic muscle for a representative
organization (the CDC) and thereby the community residents.
This would seem to indicate that economic achievement is
central to, and must accompany if not precede, social
achievement.
It is quite apparent that the selection of goals
by a CDC and its community is not an easy task, that conflict
is inevitable. It also seems apparent that compromise is
necessary if any or all goals are to be achieved, and that
concentration on any single sub-set of goals may preclude
achievement of another sub- set. The resolution of such
1Ibid., pp. 47-50.
2Faux, "Background Paper," pp. 53> 55.
^Perry, "Federal Support for the CDCs," p. 21.
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conflicts and the achievement of a proper mix is a major
problem faced by the CDC.
Figure 3 illustrates the problem of competition and
conflict which accompanies the goal-setting process faced by
the community and its development process.
CDC Investment Strategies
Earlier in this chapter, the terms "more-developed"
and "less-developed" were introduced to describe the relative
community development existing in urban and rural areas
respectively. The urban setting was described as requiring
a program to mitigate the "bad" effects of change and to gain
a better distribution of "good" effects resulting therefrom.
Similarly, the rural setting was described as requiring a
program to take advantage of the "good" effects of change or
to bring "good" to an area which change has passed by. This
section provides a brief outline of federal funding levels
provided to rural and urban CDCs and outlines the respective
investment strategies used to achieve development goals in
each setting. Rural needs and strategies are treated in
somewhat greater depth because both CDCs which are examined
in this study serve rural impact areas.
Federal funding
Federal funding levels are shown in table 1.
The largest amount granted to a single CDC went to

































New York. If this amount, $33, 584,000, is subtracted from
the total funding, the remainder, $131,852,000, has been
distributed 56 percent to urban CDCs and 44 percent to
rural.
TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF 0E0 FUNDING TO ALL CDCs UNDER TITLE VII
OF THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1964-
,
AS AMENDED, FISCAL YEARS 1968-1974-



















Total 1 , 640 10,923 29,994 31,271 24,505 35,193 31,910 165,436




The typical urban impact area experiences social and
economic pressures which produce a steady deterioration of
the environment. Development efforts must actively counter
these forces and byproducts of change. According to the
Abt Associates (AAI) evaluation of the Special Impact Program,
urban residents perceive their short-term needs as primarily
housing and better paying jobs to replace low paying jobs
which have no future.
Abt Associates, Inc., An Evaluation of the Special
Impact Program: Final Report
,
4 vols (Cambridge, Mass.,
December, 1973), 2: 186.
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Business investments are diversified, with, the
heaviest emphasis in retail, service, and construction
property development. The latter investments do not produce
jobs but provide opportunities to leverage available
funds accompanied by the possibility of better housing.
Manufacturing has received less emphasis than other types of
ventures and substantially less emphasis than in rural areas.
Efforts to keep resident spending in the area and localize
the economic multiplier effect are evident in the development
of retail and service businesses. The urban GDC must con-
stantly contend with the negative forces present in the
community.
Table 2 presents the sector distribution of ventures
established by sixteen rural and sixteen urban CDCs.
TABLE 2
DISTRIBUTION OF CDC VENTURES BY SECTOR
Sector
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Rural impact areas served by CDCs generally have few
resources that are needed to support industrialization. As
a consequence, most are agricultural and not very prosperous.
The work force has few appropriate skills. New businesses
generally must rely on the development of "foreign" markets
in which to sell their products. However, as a rule, raw
materials instead of finished products are exported. Rural
underdeveloped area residents perceive their highest priority
need as jobs, which generally do not exist in the area.
Housing is also accorded a high priority.
The emphasis which rural CDCs place on manufacturing
type activities is apparent in table 2 (page 51). Establish-
ment of manufacturing activity does result in a net gain in
jobs and income to the community, if not to the national
product, because of the export nature of the markets served.
It also reflects the need to serve those "foreign" markets
instead of trying to establish local markets in areas with
limited personal resources. The AAI study shows that thirteen
rural CDCs placed from 4-0 to 100 percent of their investment
funds into manufacturing activities. Twelve invested more than
260 percent and seven more than 80 percent. The fact that such




2Abt Associates, An Evaluation: Final Report , 4:6.
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activities places a heavy emphasis on developing a well-
rounded business capability on the CDC staff. Expertise in
feasibility studies, marketing and market development, cost-
control, and analysis, as well as other areas is required.
Similar capabilities must be established within the venture,
if it is to become independent of the CDC staff, to allow the
CDC staff to apply itself to other CDC venture development
activities.
Another problem in manufacturing venture establish-
ment is the relatively large capital investment required.
Although most rural manufacturing ventures are labor intensive,
substantial capital investment is required. Frequently, the
ability to carry inventory due to the seasonal aspects of
the market requires substantial lines of credit or other
debt. Toys, tents, and kayaks manufactured by Job Start
Corporation ventures in Southeastern Kentucky provide
examples of this situation (see chapter IV). The ability to
attract outside investment and financing is important to the
survival and growth of manufacturing ventures, but CDCs in
rural areas have experienced relatively more difficulty in
obtaining such financing from local lending institutions
than have urban CDCs. The ability and experience of the
CDC staff and venture management are crucial in arranging
outside funding.
Brady J. Deaton, "CDCs: A Development Alternative
for Rural America," Growth and Change 6 (January, 1975): 52.
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Office of Economic Development Policy
on the Special Impact Program *
The Office of Economic Development (OED) is charged
with the administration of the Special Impact Program (SIP).
It is a part of the Office of Economic Opportunity, which
was established by the EOA. The OED has developed a policy
statement for the SIP in conjunction with the representatives
of the CDCs, the National Congress for Economic Development
"1
and the Center for Community Economic Development."1" The
coordinated development of the policy statement is evidence
of OED's desire to foster maximum CDC participation in the
policy-making process.
This section examines the policy statement, summarizing
pertinent portions as they arise in the discussion. The
entire statement is presented in appendix A.
Program priorities
Appreciable impact . The legislative objective of
the SIP is to achieve appreciable impact in arresting
tendencies toward dependency, chronic unemployment, and
community deterioration. The policy statement realistically
defines appreciable impact as occurring not when poverty is
eliminated, but rather when the current downward economic,
social, and institutional trends have been reversed.
Office of Economic Development, Letter from Associ-
ate Director, OED, to Executive Director, National Congress





Suggested factors which will indicate appreciable impact
are listed as net inflow vice outflow of Jobs and income,
attraction of private capital to the area through estab-
lishment of profitable ventures and property development,
reduction in unemployment and an increase in skilled
managerial-production workers in the area.
The next chapter examines suggested measurement
criteria, such as those indicated above, and also discusses
the disagreements surrounding the use and meaning of such
criteria.
Self-sufficiency . Another legislative goal of the
SIP is the creation of permanent social and economic benefits
which will survive the termination of federal funding. The
considerations regarding self-sufficiency are different for
the CDC than for the CDC-established business venture.
The CDC business venture is expected to attain self-
sufficiency over the short term in order to provide for its
own financing and growth. In this regard, the short-term
goal of the venture is expected to be profit maximization.
Profit optimization may allow for contribution to CDC social
goals but must remain a long-term goal. This is obviously
in response to the legislative intent to provide permanent
Unless otherwise noted, the remainder of this section
is based on U.S., Office of Economic Development, "Policy
Statement on Special Impact Program" (Washington, D.C., 1974-) ;
and interviews with Louis Ramirez, Associate Director, OED,
and Barbara Cleveland, Program Analyst, OED, in Washington,
D.C., March 27, 1975-
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benefits in the event of funding termination-. If still
dependent on the CDC at that point, the venture would most
likely fail.
Data presented in chapter VI clearly indicate that
some ventures examined for this study have not reached the
break-even point after two to four years of operation.
The undesirability of continuing the operation of an
unprofitable venture was emphasized by the Associate Director
of OED. The CDC is encouraged to make the decision to
terminate such a venture or to consciously make the decision
to operate it on a subsidized basis for other than business
reasons. A decision to continue could be justified if the
cost of continuing is less than the amount of transfer
payments which would be required to provide for basic income
needs of the workers. Continuation of such a situation,
however, can bleed off CDC assets and lead to the develop-
ment of the attitude that efficiency is not required
because of the government subsidy. Attraction of long-term
financing to supplant government financing would be difficult
with a record of negative earnings. In the event of govern-
ment termination of CDC funding, the venture would fail
anyway, and few permanent benefits would remain.
CDC self-sufficiency is a somewhat different matter.
The policy statement indicates that even self-sufficient
ventures cannot be expected to generate profits great enough
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to cover CDC costs in the short term. The goal of CDC self-
sufficiency may not even be an appropriate long-range goal.
Faux agrees, indicating a decline in the number of CDC
leaders who regard self-sufficiency "as a realistic goal for
the foreseeable future. " The policy statement is vague 'on
how such self-sufficiency would be attained, and the Associ-
ate Director concludes that the avenues to achievement of
such a goal are probably outside the capability of present
SIP funding levels.
Employment . The greatest need perceived by rural
area residents has been reported earlier as jobs. This has
led to emphasis on job-creating manufacturing ventures, at
least in rural areas. However, the policy statement indicates
that short-term job creation normally should not be pursued
as an objective at the expense of venture profits. This is
quite in consonance with decisions to close unprofitable
venture facilities in Southeastern Kentucky, as reported in
chapter IV.
Institution-building . This is characterized as the
top priority effort of the SIP. Creation of new organiza-
tions (e.g., community organizations, CDCs, ventures) and
changing the behavior and attitudes of existing organizations
( e *S«i government, banks, and investors) are the primary
Faux, "Background Paper, " p. 53«
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objectives. The concept is to create new resources and make
them available to the community economic development effort.
Although challenges to established power centers are
implied, the basic strategy seems to be to work within the
economic and political structure, gaining a share while
adding to the structure rather than demanding a share of what
exists. This contrasts with the direction taken by some
community development efforts outlined earlier in this
chapter.
Human development . Through the establishment of
ventures and provision of jobs and job opportunities, job
skills in both production and management areas will be
developed. The primary beneficiaries are the low-income
residents of the impact area.
Other factors
Prior to leaving the area of OED policy, two additional
factors brought out in the interviews should be mentioned.
1. OED has encouraged the CDCs to develop business
expertise and orientation within their operations. The
same orientation seems to be evolving at OED in response
to the emphasis on CDC-venture self-sufficiency and
profitability.
2. The Associate Director indicated that present plans
are to fully fund INED's operations with the CDCs in fiscal
year 1975. However, fiscal year plans for 1976 and 1977
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will require the CDCs to fund half and then all, respectively,
of support received from IKED in entrepreneurial search over
the next two years. The objective seems to be to require
the CDCs that utilize IKED assistance to pay for what they
use rather than accommodate the entire cost through a separate
grant to IKED. It is another move toward leaving policy and
program decisions at the local level, but it is also indica-
tive of skepticism regarding the efficacy and value of the
IKED program, and perhaps the whole concept of entrepreneurial
search and ventures.
Summary
This chapter has explored the evolution of the concepts
of community development and community economic development.
Initial militancy by advocates of community control was
offered as one possible reason for the increased emphasis on
the economic objectives of community development. The CDC is
in the position of implementing developmental activity while
protecting community interests and control. By OED policy,
CDC-established ventures are expected to maximize profits in
the short term. If this policy is to be effectuated, then
the CDC must pursue every possible means of assisting its
ventures in becoming profitable. In the extreme, this would
relegate community control to a relatively minor role as
business interests were pursued to the exclusion of all
else. However, it is apparent from the literature that
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developmental programs are unsuccessful unless control is
in the hands of the intended beneficiaries.
It is apparent that both extremes incur some type
of added costs, and neither will achieve the objectives of
all parties. This would seem to imply that the entrepreneur
is a suitable partner of the community in joint ventures
designed to achieve community development, particularly
where the community lacks any of the resources necessary to
venture success, or if it can be demonstrated that entre-
preneurial ventures enjoy superior performance.
A general philosophical background has been provided
for the development of the two CDC case studies presented in
chapters IV and V.
Before considering the specific CDCs, however, a
review of Special Impact Program study efforts is presented
in chapter III. The problems and criticisms of measurement





The process of evaluating the impact of the SIP and
the CDC on their areas is complex. The assumption that such
impact can be assessed implies that goals and objectives can
be defined and isolated so that measurement criteria can be
established. Further, it implies that adequate and appropri-
ate data can be generated and collected so that evaluation
of progress or success can be made in terms of agreed-upon
measurement criteria. This is a formidable task.
The difficulty of such an assessment in the specific
instance of the SIP can be attributed basically to two
factors. The first is the vague language of the legislation.
Such key concepts as maximum feasible participation, appreci-
able impact, chronic unemployment, and community deterior-
ation are not defined. In fact, the SIP itself is defined
in only the most general terms. This leads directly to a
second, related factor, which was discussed at some length
in the previous chapter: the problem of mixed and competing






This chapter addresses studies of the SIP which are
related to the present research. In order to set the stage
for the discussion, suggested criteria for impact measurement
are examined first. Criteria established in one study are
presented together with strong criticism of those criteria
by a policy research organization. Such disagreement is
commonplace when the accomplishments and the goals of the
SIP are discussed.
The assumption is made that evaluation of the SIP
is a two-tier problem that evaluates the efficiency of CDC
business ventures and incorporates those results into the
CDC evaluation. If the CDC is not achieving the desired
impact on its multiple goals, then one way to change direction
is to revise venture strategy and emphasis. Without venture
efficiency information, an overall evaluation does not seem
possible. An evaluation of the efficiency and performance
of six CDC ventures is presented in chapter VI.
Measurement Criteria
The CDC utilizes a multifaceted approach to the
problems of its impact area, as pointed out in the previous
chapter. Among other things, the CDC attempts to generate
community involvement in its program and community control
over the resources and results of its efforts. The CDC will
attempt to establish economic enterprises to produce jobs
and income, community organizations to assist in determining
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the direction of political efforts made possible by economic
K
achievement and to change the behavior of existing institu-
tions (banks, governments, etc.) from passive non-participation
to active support and involvement in community efforts. These
goals and objectives are interrelated and intermingled. -They
are at once political, social, and economic. But whatever the
goals and objectives, it is essential that some criteria of
measurement be established. Without them, it will become
increasingly difficult to gain support in the scramble for
limited national resources.
Brower ' s Criteria
Brower describes community development as a "complex
web" which involves economic, social, human, and political
development. He recognizes the importance of the economic
factors but eschews them as too narrow to describe or evaluate
the entire process. Although offered over four years ago,
his effort is still quoted as one of the few of its kind.
Brower offers criteria for measuring success in terms of three
goals, indicated below.
Economic . The economic criteria suggested are fairly
standard and can be represented either in absolute terms or
relative to SIP grant levels.
1. Funds raised from other governmental sources, non-
governmental grants, or private sources
2. Number of .jobs created on the CDC staff and in CDC
business ventures—effect on local unemployment,
underemployment, and family income
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J. Attraction of outside businesses to locate in the
impact area— a related factor is provision of a
market by a private firm for impact area products
4-. Housing units produced or rehabilitated
5. Number of businesses started or assisted
Each criterion is quantifiable and can be expressed
as a ratio in terms of government investment to provide an
indication of unit cost to the government. The efficiency of
the venture concerned in the use of its resources is also
indicated in economic terms.; leveraging of SIP funds, .
provision of jobs, increases in income, and provision of
housing seem to be of greatest importance. However, when
computed at the CDC level, such measures provide little
direct information regarding the performance of individual
business ventures. They provide no insight into what
constitutes a proper mix of ventures by sector for a par-
ticular CDC. Finally, they do not seem to accommodate fully
the policy of OED which gives the primary short-term objective
of ventures as profit maximization. Even the economic indi-
cators are mixed with social-political objectives.
Social, organizational, and human development . Bui ld-
ing of community organizations through which residents can
participate and develop experience and skills is fundamental.
Criteria suggested by Brower are again at the CDC level,
Michael J. Brower, The Criteria for Measuring the
Success of a Community Development Corporation in the Ghetto
(Cambridge, Mass. : Center for Community Economic Develop-
ment, 1970), pp. 6-?.
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except for reference to employment and income.
t
Quantifica-
tion of these criteria is considered by Brower to be difficult
if not virtually impossible.
1. How viable is the CDC? What is the decision process
and involvement?
2. How broad is the CDC organizational base with regard
to the community? Who elects the Board of Directors?
Are community organizations growing in size? Does
the community know about the CDC and its accomplish-
ments?
3. Is community attitude turning to hope rather than
apathy?
4. What are the trends in attained educational level,
mortality rate, crime and arrest rate, alcohol and
drug abuse, and participation in adult education
programs?
5. Does the CDC employ community residents? In what
capacity? What is the wage level of employees
relative to comparable outside positions?!
Political development . Although the CDC is a non-
profit organization and prohibited from political activity
under terms of that status as set forth in the Internal
Revenue Code, section 501(c)(3), the ultimate result of its
activities is probably the creation of political influence.
Political activities can be entered into by affiliated
membership organizations, unless they, too, are incorporated
in a nonprofit status. Suggested political development
criteria include the following:
1. Voting and voter registration trends, and the degree





2. Involvement of the community in political organi-
zations, number of residents standing as candidates
for election, and issues of community interest
"being addressed by legislative or government bodies
3. Share of funds or services being funneled into the
area by local governments
4. Degree of attention devoted to the community by
established power centers and figures^
Some of these criteria can be quantified and have
been, in fact, in the previously mentioned AAI studies. The
quality and effects of these factors, however, are still
elusive resultants.
Brower also discusses the question of how long a CDC
should be allowed to operate before being considered "success-
ful. " He concludes that CDCs might become self-sufficient
in five to fifteen years, and some may never achieve that
status. Most CDCs remain dependent on sizable outside grants
for ten years, and some even longer. A measureable, heavy
impact on community economic, political, and social and human
development might occur in a decade, or a few years sooner in
2the most successful case.
The AAI Report Criteria
In a report issued in March, 1972, Abt Associates,
Incorporated (AAI), described "impact" as occurring in terms
of achievement of CDC-expressed goals. These included





reduced out-migration, and capital development^) , as well as
less specific terms (e.g., human capital development,
consumer services, reduced dependency, changed institutional
behavior, and community control). Measurement was attempted
through venture performance data, interviews, and question-
naires administered to area residents. In a later study,
these measures were repeated and related to change over time,
implying that "appreciable impact" has a time dimension.
This recognizes the questions related to the length of time
that should be allowed for a CDC to produce impact and when
2
measurements should be made.
The lack of agreement on measurement criteria is
illustrated by the comments of the CDC Committee to Review
the Evaluation of the Special Impact Program. The committee
operated through the National Congress of Community Economic
Development, meeting with AAI researchers as the study
progressed. Both the Phase I Report and the Interim Report
drew similar comments. Only the comments on the Interim
Report are presented below.
The committee charged that AAI failed to reflect
accurately the nature of the SIP and the legislative mandate
Abt Associates, Inc., An Evaluation of the Special
Impact Program: Phase I Report
,
4- vols. ("Cambridge } f'iass.,
19727; 1:6-'/.
2Abt Associates, Inc., An Evaluation of the Special




which launched it. This was described as apparent in
"measures made, conclusions drawn and language of the report."
Exception was also taken to the methodology employed. It
appears, however, that the basic objection related to the
measures and inferences drawn from them.
AAI broke the program into components, of which
jobs created was a major component and measure. The
committee agreed that the program could be broken into
components. However, it objected to the notion that
optimizing the components optimized the program, stating
that the comprehensive, integrated program could not be
measured with reference to its elemental parts. The time
element was introduced by the committee in two related ways.
First, results do not occur in a linear relationship with
investment. Rather, resource utilization becomes more
efficient with experience, implying that employment, ROI,
and other measures of efficiency improve over time.
Secondly, the elapsed time from inception to measurement
must be a factor in drawing conclusions. The measures used
are criticized as being inadequate and misleading to an
overall evaluation. Significantly, the committee offered
no alternative measures.
These examples are given to illustrate the disagree-
ment over measurement criteria. The issue raises a




period without demonstrable results, if not ^appreciable
impact" by some criteria? Or will the struggle for scarce
national resources result in abandonment of the program and
allocation of resources to another purpose?
It appears that there should be recognition of the
fact that component optimization may be sacrificed to achieve
some other objective. But that fact should not preclude
measurement of component performance. When decisions are
made not to optimize, the decision maker should be clearly
aware of the costs of that decision and the benefits which
might accrue to some other component, or the overall
program, through such suboptimization.
The following sections address four major reports
relating to the SIP. The first, by the Westinghou.se Learning
Corporation (WLC), is an evaluation of the 1968 program.
The other three, all by AAI, cover generally the 1970-1973
time period. Collectively, they represent the most important
evaluations of the SIP that have been made.
Westinghouse Learning Corporation Study
The Westinghouse Learning Corporation Study evaluated
the 1968 performance of the SIP under Title I-D of the EOA,
as amended. Five urban and two rural programs were examined.
This section summarizes and is based upon Westing-
house Learning Corporation, An Evaluation of Fiscal Year 1968
Special Impact Programs
, vol. 1: Summary , and vol. 2: Kentucky





The two rural programs were comparable efforts administered
by the Farmers Home Administration of the Department of
Agriculture in rural areas of North Carolina and Kentucky.
Although the Kentucky program was also in the southeastern
part of the state, it did not encompass any of the counties
subsequently included in the Job Start Corporation program
(see chapter IV).
Evaluation Model Elements
The evaluation model was composed of the three
elements indicated below.
Economic
The economic analysis distinguished between macro and
micro levels. At the micro level, changes in individual
employment experience and income were investigated. At the
macro level, the multiplier effect was analyzed through an
examination of changes in levels of exogenous spending in the
economy and displacements caused by the extent to which new
jobs, sales, and profits reduced jobs, sales, and profits
available in the same economy. Data were developed from
local CDC and federal administration files and through three
sets of surveys.
Qualitative
The qualitative element was designed to provide a
basic comparability between SIP areas and other facets of
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the overall evaluation. It served as the basis for case
studies of the projects studied. Data were developed on-site
through interviews, observations, census data, media content,
and other associated federal and local agencies.
Quantitative
Quantitative data were developed through a series of
interviews with area residents, neighborhood leaders, and
employees of the CDC. Problems were encountered in sampling
procedure, non-response, and finally, cancellation by 0E0
of the final interview attempts because of the excessive time
lapse between surveys. As a result, the data were used only
to gain some insight into the differences in characteristics
of CDC program participants and non-participants.
Findings
General
Because the primary concern of the present research
is rural development programs, and because the remainder of
the WLC report is devoted to findings regarding specific CDCs,
only the results pertaining to the two rural CDCs are
summarized herein.
The funding levels granted the Kentucky and the North
Carolina programs were about the same ($1.4 million and
$1.3 million respectively). Results achieved, however, were
significantly different. In North Carolina, some small
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industry was in existence, and potential industrial sites
had been identified by existing industrial development
commissions. A sense of competition, but not conflict, was
present among the four counties involved in the program.
Growth and opportunity of the entire area was the common •
concern. Eleven outside industries were attracted to the
area, employing about 1,200 residents. Almost all of the
jobs were low-paying "cut and sew" jobs, probably not of the
type envisioned by SIP legislation because they offered no
advancement opportunities. But they were jobs nevertheless,
and they did satisfy the priority need of poor rural area
residents. Non-economic accomplishments included providing
running water for 300 black families, a bookmobile to provide
library services to rural residents, a low-cost housing
project, and plans for a health care facility. By both
economic and non-economic standards, the project was a
success.
The Kentucky program stands in stark contrast with
the North Carolina experience. The local CDC and its board
of directors represented an eight-county area, but SIP grants
were allocated for only four of these counties. Visits by
a national politician to one of the counties carried with
them the implication that that county would be favored. The
implied suggestion caused intensification of the rivalry




Kentucky program by the Farmers Home Administration was much
less flexible than the North Carolina program. Also, the
eight-county area (to which the grant was finally extended
in an effort to lessen conflict) did not form a "natural
union. " Few industrial sites were available or even identified.
In the end, only $150,000 of the original grant was expended,
and results produced were insignificant.
The results of the two experiences exemplify all of
the problems which can beset such an effort. Local conflict
without coordination and cooperation, poor administration,
and poorly defined goals and objectives were all factors
contributing to the failure of the Kentucky program.
Lessons learned
Several lessons were learned from the two programs.
1. Impact areas chose among the broad legislative goals,
and these influenced strategies adopted.
2. Target areas are hard to identify and maintain in
the pursuit of common goals. The study questioned the
ability to isolate a relatively small neighborhood, as
suggested by the legislation.
3- Results take many forms, making it difficult to
measure success on an absolute scale. A better process may
measure progress toward self-set goals. Certainly, job
provision in North Carolina was successful. However,
evaluation may be the measurement of expectation.
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4. The definition of community participation and control
is an elusive one. It takes a different form in each area.
It may involve businessmen, self-selected individuals,
militants, or even non-residents. Community control and
involvement were positive factors in North Carolina but
strongly negative in Kentucky.
5. The business of business is profits, not partnership.
Initial efforts to persuade industry to locate in high-risk
urban or rural poverty areas were largely unsuccessful.
6. Coordination of all government bureaucratic efforts
in an area is most difficult. Each agency tends to look at
its own program in isolation of others.
7. Institutional structure change is difficult to
achieve. Banks, for example, shy away from poverty areas
for the same reasons that businesses do.
8. Jobs created in such a program may not lead to
development of skills or careers.
9. Small businesses have a high failure rate. SIP funds
must provide sufficient long-term investment to ensure
success opportunities.
Summary
The WLC study illustrates many of the problems
experienced in subsequent CDC programs. Among these are
the difficulty in persuading businesses and institutions
to participate, the creation of Job opportunities and not
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just jobs, the failure of small business, and the difficulty
in establishing criteria for, and measurement of, success.
The evaluation of the study must be tempered with the
realization that the SIP had been in existence less than two
years at the time of the data collection.
AAI Study: Phase I
The first phase of the Abt Associates, Incorporated
(AAI) program involved the operations of seventeen CDCs
during the period from July 1970 through June 1971* A survey
of community residents and employees was conducted from June
through August, 1971? and results were incorporated into the
study. CDC and CDC-venture data collection was accomplished
on-site as well as at the OEO's Washington, D.C., offices,
both for this study and the subsequent AAI studies.
Analytical procedures included financial performance
projections, cost-benefit analysis (where applicable), cross-
tabulation of survey results to determine benefits distri-
bution, and regression analysis related to CDC organization
structures and practices, economic and institutional
environmental variables, and 0E0 administrative procedures.
While procedures were described in some detail in actual
analysis presentation, no overall model was constructed
wherein all analytical techniques and interrelationships
This section summarizes and is based- upon Abt





were developed. This comment pertains to all three AAI
reports. It is a factor which renders overall evaluation
difficult.
Barriers to "Appreciable Impact"
The AAI Phase I Report states that "appreciable
impact" had not occurred because of the three constraints
indicated below.
' 1. CDC strategy implies broad goals, including
community support and influencing of institu-
tions, which preclude the reduction of
unemployment and dependency in the short term
2. The business venture, a primary development
vehicle, cannot stress employment and dependency
on an unsubsidized basis without incurring
financial loss
3. SIP funding levels were inadequate
CDC Strategies and Performance
Evaluation of CDC performance was made in the light
of the constraints listed above and focuses on a perceived
three-function strategy of the CDC as indicated below.
Performance as a
development fund
Examination of the strategy of performance as a
development fund showed venture startups as a primary
activity, with skill and management training taking place
and sometimes resulting in short-term losses to the




the break-even point at the end of four* years in spite of
inexperienced management, market competition, and unbalanced
capital structures. Outside financing and preferential
market treatment were characteristics of better performance.
Performance as a
demonstration effort
Performance as a demonstration effort refers largely
to the ability of the CDCs to attract outside financing from
private or other government sources. Not surprisingly, the
size of the SIP grant and the relative experience of the
CDC staff appeared to be governing factors.
CDCs as institutions
for community control
Measures of community control were tentatively
identified as follows:
1. Accountability to residents measured by the composi-
tion of the boards of directors and the attitudes
of residents as indicated in surveys
2. Transfer of resources to residents (e.g., stock sale
to individuals and transfer of venture stock to
community organizations)
3. Resident support of CDC as determined by
questionnaire
Substantial variation in results was observed.
Generally, boards of directors were dominated by the profes-
sional staff members. Transfer of stock and ownership has




General recommendations included more autonomy for
the CDCs, particularly regarding venture investment decisions,
and an emphasis on attainment of "break-even by ventures.
Summary
Many of the criticisms aimed at the AAI Interim
Report "by the review committee mentioned earlier had "been
originally leveled at the Phase I Report. In particular, the
use of jobs as a measurement of impact and the stress on
venture profits were criticized. The tendency to look at
only the short-term economic goals and an apparent disagree-
ment in the interpretation of the legislative mandate were
also mentioned. Finally, the committee found unacceptable
the tendency "to overlook what they cannot or choose not to
measure." As in the criticism of the Interim Report, the
committee offered no alternative measurement criteria.
Of more concern to this researcher is the lack of an
overall model and conceptual framework within which the study
could be developed. The reliance on projections of break-
even points and profitability formulated largely by the
ventures themselves produced questionable conclusions which
later proved to be overly optimistic. Finally, the definition
of variables was not precise. The committee which criticized
the report, however, was even less precise.
See above, pp. 69-70.
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AAI Study: Interim Report •
The second phase of the AAI study included an evalu-
ation of thirty CDC grantees. The purposes of this phase
were stated as revising the descriptive model that was
presented in the Phase I Report, analyzing program efficiency
and determining whether it had achieved "appreciable impact."
An examination of program and venture efficiency is withheld
2
until the final report is discussed.
Program Model
The program model was described as evolving from the
legislation and the interpretation of that legislation by
the CDCs. The model does not attempt to interpret the
legislation except through the actions of the CDC. It
separates benefits to the individual from those accruing
to the community as a whole.
Program benefits to
the individual
Primary benefits to the individual are employment and
income. Human development and reduced out-migration are
presumed to be benefits of employment and resulting on-the-
job training. The CDC strategy regarding choice of sector
in which to develop activity seems to be influenced by the
This section summarizes and is based upon Abt Asso-
ciates, Inc. , An Evaluation: Interim Report .
See below, pp. 90-92.
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setting: rural or urban. The sector selection in turn
produces differences in employment impact, Job quality, and
wage impact, all accompanied by tradeoffs among goals. Rural
areas emphasize manufacturing to produce large numbers of
jobs, generally with limited advancement possibilities. The
cumulative wage impact is substantial. Urban concentration
on property development does not create jobs but shows
promise of high quality impact through leveraging and housing
development. Retail activities in urban areas provide needed
community facilities but create few, low-paying jobs.
Tradeoffs are also made between individual benefits and




The program model emphasizes a parallel and reinforcing
approach to community benefits. The emphasis here is on
institutions and their relation to community development.
Included as institutions are the CDC and its ventures, with
community ownership as an institutional goal. Provision of
consumer services (e.g., retail food stores) is important to
poverty areas and represents a form of institutional influence.
It was found that the efforts to provide community
benefits suffer from lack of clear statements of purpose.





In the interim study, AAI analysts took the first
step toward defining "appreciable impact." A single resident
benefit, employment, was selected for the initial examination.
The definition selected was the elimination of the gap
between unemployment rates in the impact area and its
surrounding SliSA or county over a period of ten years.
The report concluded that the impact had approximated one-
third to one-half of the required annual rate. The main
reasons for non-achievement are that funding levels at any
one site have been inadequate, that CDC efficiency in
resource utilization must be improved, and that private
sector support must increase.
Summary
The AAI Interim Report showed definite progress
toward the goal of SIP evaluation. For the first time, the
definition of "appreciable impact" was attempted, albeit
in a limited way. As will be shown, the final report
modified that definition but did little to extend it to non-
economic benefits. The descriptive program model separated
and defined both individual and community benefits. These
benefits should be addressed as the dependent variables in
the definition and measurement of program goals. Unfortu-
nately, quantification of the community, non-economic goals
still seems a remote possibility.
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The definition of "appreciable impact" as it relates
to employment seems less than satisfactory. Changes in the
surrounding areas affect the achievement of the goal, "both
negatively and positively, and are completely outside the
control of the program. It would seem desirable to establish
a definition for which achievement can be measured inde-
pendently of what happens outside the impact area.
A tentative conclusion is offered by the report that
manager participation and/or partnership (entrepreneurship
is an example) might create a higher probability of
profitability than complete CDC ownership and control.
Private sector support could, to some extent, be provided
through the involvement of entrepreneurs in venture estab-
lishment and activity. This point was not pursued in the
final report.
AAI Study: Final Report
The final report of the AAI study extended the
coverage to thirty-three grantees and the data collection
and analysis over a three-year period. Data were collected
and analyzed on CDC administrative expenses and the benefits
created, the distribution of benefits over time, and resident
perception and attitudes toward CDC activities. The inability
to define a rigorous analytical framework with specific
This section summarizes and is based upon Abt Asso-
ciates, Inc., An Evaluation: Final Report .

8?
methodology was acknowledged and attributed to the nature of
the problems addressed by the SIP. This apparently refers
to the inapplicability of such statistical and analytical
techniques as hypothesis testing and correlation and regres-
sion analysis as central methods of the research. Much of
the analysis is described as relying on "careful interpre-
tation of observed characteristics and relationships."
However, an overall framework was not constructed.
The final report interprets the elusive concept,
"appreciable impact," as significant improvement in one or
more conditions in the community over a period of time.
Generally, it is conceived in this report as having occurred
when the gap between impact area conditions and surrounding
SMSA or county conditions has been cut in half. The report
recognizes the relative ease of establishing quantitative
economic achievement criteria but dismisses as almost
impossible similar quantification of social goal achievement
because "there is no valid concept of a viable urban or
rural community. " The measurement of social and political
goal achievement is made across the three years of the
evaluation using results from the AAI studies only.
Major areas of investigation relevant to the present




To assess the degree of "appreciable impact" achieve-
ment and potential for future achievement by the CDCs,
measurement of both economic and social goal achievement were
presented in the AAI final report. In the matter of social
achievement, however, data and conclusions presented originate
in differences noted between two sets of AAI data generated
in 1971 and 1973- No comparable data were found for the
nation or the areas concerned. Because only fifteen sites
were examined in 1971? "the final comparison is limited to
these sites. Concomitant data limitations are fully
recognized in the report.
Economic achievement
Measurements of economic achievement included
employment, skill development, and non-managerial employee
income.
1. At the present growth rate in CDC and CDC-venture
employment and under present development strategies, the
elapsed time to achieve appreciable impact on employment
was estimated at seventeen years for urban sites and eight
years- for rural. Part of this time difference is due to
the emphasis on the job creation strategy of the rural areas.
However, only 40 percent of the jobs created in rural areas
have gone to previously unemployed persons. In urban
areas, only 15 percent have gone to the previously unemployed.
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It appears that rural areas may achieve appreciable impact
while urban areas will have more difficulty.
2. Achievement of appreciable impact in skill improvement
within fifteen years would require a growth rate of 35 per-
cent in urban areas and 32 percent in rural. Present growth
rates were reported as negative in the urban areas and 127 per-
cent in rural areas. The latter figure, however, apparently
is influenced by the effects of starting with an almost
completely unskilled labor base where any numerical improvement
results in large percentage increases. It is not expected to
continue.
3. The emphasis on improving income has been much greater
in urban areas than in rural. Current CDC non-managerial
wages are reported at 150 percent of urban median family
incomes and 120 percent of rural in their respective impact
areas. However, percentage increases over previous incomes
are only 12 percent in urban areas and 3 percent in rural.
This suggests two related conclusions. The first is that
little impact has been made on family incomes, particularly
in rural areas. The second is that rural areas have compro-
mised wages in favor of the number of Jobs created. But the
study also indicates that sizable gaps still exist between





A 1971 community survey provided a benchmark against
which 1973 changes were measured. Perceptions of community
residents regarding conditions and change in two general
areas are summarized in tables 3 and 4-.
Table 3 indicates that, except for the factor
regarding private investment, the rural areas reflected
almost no change in perceptions. However, most perceptions
are favorable. The urban results reflect significant
negative change in perceptions. This may be indicative of
unfulfilled expectations and the inability of the CDC to
counter the negative forces existent in the urban areas.
'D'
TABLE 3
APPRECIABLE IMPACT: COMMUNITY RESIDENT PERCEPTIONS
OP ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND CHANGE
(Percentage of Respondents)
Urban Rural
1971 1973 1971 1973
More job opportunities now 59-0 48.3 70.0 72.2
Less unemployment now 4-7*5 38.5 60.0 64-.
5
CDC has gotten jobs 85.2 85.1 90.0 88.8
Most of private sector is
trying to help 27-5 18.6 4-0.0 42.0
More private sector
interest now 54-. 29-5 70.0 70.4-
CDC has increased private
sector interest 74.0 53-1 82.0 70.1
SOURCE: Abt Associates, Inc., An Evaluation of the Special
Impact Program: Pinal Report
,





A similar picture emerges from the examination of
political-social climate and change as shown in table 4.
Rural areas show little change, but a large percentage of
residents assess the picture in a positive manner. Urban
area residents see the situation deteriorating. The CDC
role is not completely clear in either case. Because it is
probably more visible in a rural setting which is almost
devoid of development activities, the CDC may be viewed by
residents as more responsible for change. The inference is
that the CDC is a positive factor. In urban areas, so many
other factors come into play that evaluation of the CDC as
a change agent is more complex, and the cause-effect
relationship may be less well defined.
TABLE 4
APPRECIABLE IMPACT: COMMUNITY RESIDENT PERCEPTIONS
OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CLIMATE AND CHANGE
(Percentage of Respondents)
Urban Rural
1971 1973 1971 1973
Government trying to help
more now 65-1 46.3 83-0 78.3
Political process helps
more now 64.5 75.6 75-1 80.0
More community progress now 56.4 50.4 83*9 84.1
Community leaders have more
influence now 60.9 55-8 79.2 83.0
Residents can do more to
change community now 87-5 77-9 95-8 92.0
SOURCE: Abt Associates, Inc., An Evaluation of the Special
Impact Program: Final Report
,






To assess venture efficiency, measures used were
leverage achieved on CDC investment of SIP funds, cost per
Job created, and venture profitability. Study conclusions
are presented by CDC setting, by sector of activity (e.g.,
manufacturing, retail), and for the program overall. Little
information is present on which to evaluate the impact of
outside investment or entrepreneurial participation. Results
are shown in tables 5 and 6, for urban and rural sites
respectively.
The comparison paints a mixed picture. When
agriculture and construction-property development are
eliminated from the rural figures, they are generally quite
comparable to the urban figures. A large difference in
profits realized from construction-property development
projects is apparent. Agriculture, peculiar to the rural area
sites, requires high investment and creates few jobs. Of
particular interest to the present research is the relative
emphasis placed on manufacturing by rural areas and the
relatively favorable performance of this type of activity.
It is apparent, however, that profits are not being generated
consistently in any of the sectors. Another section of the
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The AAI study represents a three-year, $1.87 million
effort. It has produced three reports, each in four volumes.
Massive quantities of data have been collected, analyzed, and
presented. Yet the reports have not "been well received. '
Committee reviews summarized earlier are indicative of this
fact. Another indication is that the Ford Foundation com-
missioned the Urban Institute in 1973 "to develop criteria
and methodology for an evaluation of the economic, social,
and political goals of the CDC and the SIP. As of April, 1975,
nothing has been published. Perhaps the establishment of such
criteria should have been the starting place for any evalu-
ation effort. Economic benefits can be measured, but their
importance to the overall evaluation is a point of heated
disagreement. Non-economic benefits are more difficult to
measure, even if criteria could be agreed upon. The result
is a most difficult problem that is not near resolution.
Other Studies
A number of studies related to the SIP have been
accomplished, and these will be described briefly.
In a 1970 study, Rivera found that the participation
of local residents and their ethnic composition jointly
predict the performance of CDCs in producing benefits more
consistently than either factor alone. The inference is
See above, pp. 67-68.
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that participants from outside either the area or the ethnic
composition of the area may limit CDC performance. A
second finding was that the degree of area participant
concentration on the board of directors and CDC staff will
determine the level of comparative CDC performance more
consistently than venture or "bureaucratic management.
Block approached the question of economic impact
on the community through the development of an input-output
model. With 0E0 funding of a Comprehensive Health Center in
a rural area as a "basis, the consumption patterns of "both
residents and vendors resulting from the project were
established. An area input-output matrix was modified
p
to create a matrix for the community. Block is now under
contract to 0E0 to produce a generalized input-output
model for use at the local CDC level as an aid to decision
making.
A similar project is underway at the University
of California at Berkeley. By the use of input-output
techniques, separate models have been developed for each
of three counties within which CDCs are located. Identifi-
cation and estimation of economic inputs and development
Jose A. Rivera, "Community Control of Economic
Development Planning: A Study of the Recipient Beneficiaries
as the Actors of Change" (Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis
University, 1972).
2
A. Harvey Block, A Model for Analyzing Economic
Impact of Comprehensive Health Service Projects (Washington,
D.C. : Bokonon Systems, Inc. , 1974- ) •
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of guidelines for long-range CDC economic development
1
strategy are the goals.
Summary
The evaluation criteria and analysis methods applicable
to the SIP are not well-developed and accepted. Disagreement
over program goals still exists. Some observers question the
advisability of trying to evaluate a program which is still
developing. Quantification methods are questioned.
Despite the existing disagreements, it appears that
a fairly clear policy has been issued by OED, a policy that
has been in evolution for two years. That policy quite
clearly indicates that venture profitability maximization
is an essential short-term goal. Where conditions require
optimization rather than maximization, OED approval is
required. Measurement of other than the efficiency goals
of the venture is not as easily accomplished. Combining
efficiency and non-efficiency measures into an overall
evaluation is most difficult.
Despite the disagreements, an overall evaluation
seems important to the direction of the program, if not its
future. It seems important to quantify what can be quanti-
fied while trying to develop an overall conceptual framework
L. T. Wallace, "An Input-Output Analysis of the
Outreach of Three Community Development Corporations: Delta
Foundation, Job Start Corporation and the East Los Angeles
Community Union" (Draft), Earl Warren Legal . Institute,




and methodology within which the overall evaluation can be
accomplished.
The present research is directed toward the evalu-
ation of the performance of certain ventures established
under two separate philosophical approaches. While the
concepts of community control are very much a factor in the
philosophical processes which govern CDC activity, they are
not direct considerations in the evaluation which follows.
Only the resultants of the process are compared: the
performance of business ventures established under the
community resource rationalization approach and the
performance of those established under the entrepreneurial
search approach.
The next two chapters present case studies of two
CDCs, one of which has utilized the community resource
rationalization approach exclusively. The other has used
both approaches. The chapters present a specific geographi-






In this chapter, an abbreviated case study of the
Job Start Corporation is presented. Demographic and
geographic information provide a physical setting for the
CDC efforts. A discussion of venture establishment proce-
dures, community organizing efforts, the evolving attitudes
regarding venture selection, establishment, and profitability
provide a philosophical setting for community economic
development efforts. Individual venture development
narratives emphasize those ventures which form a basis for
the study. By way of a summary to the chapters, CDC capital
investment and growth of CDC activities are discussed.
Background
The impact area served by the Job Start Corporation
includes a ten-county area of Southeastern Kentucky (fig. 4).
Collectively and individually, the counties are among the
poorest in the nation. The population is overwhelmingly
white, with mean incomes of a significant portion of area
families below the poverty level. Unemployment is generally
Families are classified as being above or below the









































higher and the educational level attained by area adults
lower than those of the rest of Kentucky and the United
States (see table 7)« Even these figures probably under-
state the real situation. Many of those not on unemployment
rolls are underemployed in marginal agricultural activities
or poorly paid service occupations. The area is isolated
from most industrialization and industrialized areas.
Transportation and other lines of communication are generally
underdeveloped but have not been a handicap to JSC manu-
facturing ventures. Few of the human and other resources
applicable and necessary to present-day industry have been
developed and are present. Appalachia, of which Southeastern
Kentucky is a part, offers few of the attributes necessary
to industrial development and has even fev/er attributes
which cannot be provided in greater quality and quantity by
other rural areas of the country.
No conflict situation similar to that described in
the WLC study of an early Kentucky SIP effort has arisen
among the ten counties forming the JSC impact area. This
is despite the seeming lack of inherent cohesion or
commonality of interest among the participants. There are
indications that there is some rivalry and jealousy among
the counties over location of JSC ventures. However, there
Interagency Committee in 1969. A range of poverty thresholds
is provided and takes into account family size, sex and age
of family head, number of children, and farm-nonfarm resi-
dence. Poverty cutoff for farm families is $3,18-4- (four
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has not been a replay of the 1968 experience* where such
feeling precluded any progress. Constant effort is expended
by JSC staff members, particularly the executive director,
to prevent such conditions from developing.
Philosophy of Business
Venture Establishment
Initial efforts, designed to reverse the cycle of
poverty in Southeastern Kentucky under the Economic Oppor-
tunity Act of 1964, consisted largely of Community Action
Programs. These were established in various communities
under separate Community Action Agency (CAA) directors to
foster a multitude of perceived community needs (e.g.,
training, educational, health care). One of the main
activities of the CAAs was described as manpower develop-
ment and was performed under a Department of Labor contract.
Little in the way of useful, permanent skills was developed
with much of the money being expended in such activities
as picking up trash and weeds from alongside community
roadways. It was not until 1967 that attention was focused
on the problem of job creation. Jobs. require businesses,
and availability of capital must precede business establish-
ment. The beginning of economic development under the
Community Action Program consisted of a simple woodworking
Barry Stein, The Biggest Little Conglomerate in
the World: Community^ Economic Development in Kentucky
(Cambridge, Mass. : . Center for Community Economic Levelop-
ment, 1973), p. 4.
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shop set up with inadequate equipment in an unused building
in Knox County.
The CAA directors ultimately recognized that both
they and the poor they were attempting to help were
frustrated by the lack of community-level guidance directed
at community economic development. The continuing, coordi-
nated program and assistance necessary to convert the
products and the services of the poor into steady jobs,
investment, and new businesses simply were not available.
Both investment and working capital were absent, as were
the other ingredients essential to business startup and
success, such as managerial and technical expertise. As
the CAA directors saw it, these factors had to be mobilized
in the rural area of Southeastern Kentucky where the people
were before community needs could be addressed effectively.
The cooperation and coordination of the CAA
directors in the subsequent successful application for
Special Impact Funds devoted to community economic
development can be appreciated only through consideration
of the geographical remoteness and narrow local interests
of each of the communities involved. The proposed organi-
zation, Job Start Corporation, was designed to serve a
Job Start Corporation, "Continuation of a Small
Business Proposal for Southeastern Kentucky, " a refunding
proposal submitted to the Office of Economic Opportunity




ten-county area of rural Appalachian Southea-stern Kentucky
where communication between communities and mobility of the
population are limited. County government is strong, with
each county having a decidedly local base and perspective.
Simply to attain a general consensus, commonality of purpose
and direction is not an insignificant accomplishment under
such conditions. However, the desirability of a single
representative and advocate in attempts to obtain funding
for community economic development served to overshadow and
submerge the demands of natural and political diversity
which obtained between geographical sub-areas.
On October 15, 1968, the initial six-month 0E0 grant
for community economic development brought the Job Start
Corporation (JSC) to life. The JSC listed its initial goals
as the assembly of evidence concerning markets and producers,
the cultivation of sources of low- or zero-interest capital,
the determination of proposed business locations within the
ten-county impact area, and the development of a plan to
establish a separate small business development corporation.
The program was designed to cope with the root causes
of poverty in the impact area. These included the social
and political isolation of the poor, the lack of "grass-roots"
community leadership coupled with the lack of responsiveness






opportunities. Provision of job opportuniti-es was recognized
as a prerequisite for successful action against other poverty
causes and became the first priority of JSC efforts. The
second priority was the creation of poor-resident ownership
opportunities. This was seen as a means of developing social
and economic independence and community leadership. Previous
anti-poverty efforts in much of Appalachia (e.g., the man-
power training program alluded to earlier) were described as
demonstrating that economic development is essential to the
creation of social change.
Product Selection
In its earliest years, JSC subscribed wholly to the
concept of business venture startup through community resource
rationalization. This is evidenced by its selection of
products for market penetration:
Markets pursued by Job Start are determined by either
(1) the product or service already provided by a given
community (within the impact area), or (2) the product
or service in which a given community expresses an
interest or expertise.
^
The JSC role was described as providing assistance in
marketing and matching community residents (according to
interest, capability, productivity) with products having
market potential. The risk associated with this approach
Job Start Corporation, "Work Program," London,







was recognized in that the creative ideas of the community
would provide the basic source of ideas for economic
development projects. Markets would then "be created to
serve these products. Such ideas would result in production
and marketing on a test basis for a six-month period, with
pinitial investment limited to $5,000.
The venture establishment process was conceived
as having four separate stages, described as being particu-
larly useful where sophisticated feasibility studies were
impractical or impossible and where lead time for small-
scale manufacturing was short.
Stage I . Establish facility, ideas, and design
for products for which production capability and markets
appear to exist.
Stage II . Test production and test marketing of
various products of a particular type (e.g., wood) are
accomplished on a limited basis. Train a nucleus of








p. 3; and Office of Economic Opportunity,
"Highlight Memorandum, " a summary of JSC accomplishments,
community development goals, and future venture and




Stage III . Expansion of production and marketing
effort follows the development of a viable product or
product line. At this point, the working and investment
capital requirements increase substantially.
Stage IV . On attainment of self-sufficiency, the
business would be "spun off" to operate under a local county
Community Development Corporation, assuming that one had
been formed.
Summary
The subscription and adherence to the concepts of
community involvement, control, and ownership of economic
development efforts are clearly illustrated. The early
efforts of the JSC were formed around this concept and
include the development of two of the four JSC business
ventures used as a basis for this study, Possum Trot and
Lawson Furniture.
Affiliated Community Development Corporations
An important concept indicated in initial planning
involved the establishment of affiliated CDCs within the
impact area for which the JSC would perform a business
planning function and serve as a conduit for Special Impact
Funds. The original concept was to develop within each
CDC the ability eventually to perform a business venture
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ownership role. Basic to the fulfillment of this role were
such learning experiences as recruitment and screening of
job applicants and participation in basic investment and
development decisions. Realization of the final stage of
business development, as described earlier, rested on
successful establishment of representative CDCs organized
in areas of business venture startup. In addition, the
local affiliated CDC was envisioned as providing the member-
ship of the JSC board of directors, thereby placing ultimate
control and direction of community economic development at
the community or grass-roots level.
In 1971 5 JSC reported the existence of local CDCs
in various stages of organization and operation, repre-
senting seven of the ten counties in the impact area, with
2yet another county having initiated organization efforts.
In the latest JSC report of such activity, however, only two
affiliated CDCs are listed as providing representation to
the JSC board of directors. It was stated that the JSC
plans no further action to organize any such groups prior
to 1977. 5
Job Start Corporation, "CDC Status Report," London




^Job Start Corporation, "Application for Continuation
of Grant Awarded Under Title VII, Economic Opportunity Act of
1964, as Amended," London Kentucky, December 30, 197^, p- 25-
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It is now felt that support of several CDCs would be a drain
on the JSC resources and efforts and would not assist in the
attainment of current objectives.
The fact that only partial success was achieved in
the CDC organization and membership efforts was attributed
to two basic assumptions which did not prove valid:
1. Community residents would join the local CDCs
despite the lack of an established constituency
(i.e., people receiving benefits from the JSC
efforts).
2. An optimistic, almost euphoric, feeling that quick
success in community business ventures would result
in visible economic benefits. This would in turn
create a constituency in short order.
2
The first assumption ignored the lessons learned
from earlier anti-poverty programs in Appalachia. Previous
examples cited herein produced little in the way of permanent
social or economic change. Little evidence was afforded to
a skeptical population that a new program would be any
different. The second assumption ignored the "facts of life"
regarding the success rate of small businesses and the
elapsed time from conception to startup to self-sufficiency
and all of the obstacles in between. The JSC belatedly
recognized that attempts to organize could be counter-




2Job Start Corporation, "Proposal to the Office of
Economic Opportunity for Refunding of Special Impact Funds
—1973 through 1975," London, Kentucky, 1972, p. 14.
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After the relative lack of success in such organizational
efforts, the JSC decided to concentrate on "business develop-
ment and not to conduct organizational activities until
substantial and visible business and economic development
had been achieved. As noted earlier in this section,
present plans are to delay additional organizational plans
until 1977* However, existing affiliations are to be main-
tained, and the individual affiliations of JSC staff and
board members with community and professional organizations
, 2
are encouraged.
The existence of a successful CDC in Knox County
should be noted because it does operate three business
ventures while maintaining an affiliation with the JSC.
Its relationship with the JSC is conceptually close to that
envisioned for the CDCs yet to be organized. The Knox County
CDC operates Lawson Furniture, a business venture started
through the community resource rationalization approach,
and one of the ventures studied in the present research.
Federal Funding
As indicated earlier in this chapter, the JSC is
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received "by JSC under the Special Impact Program together
with the total expended on the rural CDC portion of the
program. A tabulation of funds expended for administrative
expenses and venture capital investment is also provided in
the table. Funds are indicated in the fiscal year received
although the funding period may extend beyond a single
fiscal year. These data are presented to provide a perspec-
tive of the size of the JSC program and the funding in
relation to the entire rural CDC program.
Staffing
Perhaps the most frustrating problem encountered by
the JSC in its formative period was the inability to develop
a staff with the requisite abilities and backgrounds. This
problem becomes understandable when the professional require-
ments and the geographical area are examined together. In
general, all aspects of business and business analysis must
be represented in order to function adequately. The ability
to communicate within both the local political arena and the
federal bureaucracy must be possessed by the staff. Relevant
business experience and ability, executive talent, sensitivity
to the problems of the Appalachian poor and the ability to
perform as an advocate of this constituency within the federal
bureaucracy are necessary. Add to these significant profes-
sional and personal requirements the need to settle in a
remote mountain area, and the problem is brought into

110
perspective. At present, the staff consists of seven
professionals, including an executive director, and covers
the business development, financial, overall community
pdevelopment, and community relations functions. The legal
function is fulfilled on a consulting basis.
Board of Directors
Another factor bearing on the early development of
anti-poverty work in Southeastern Kentucky was the fact that
it was not unusual for Community Action Agencies to become
involved in activities with political overtones. As indi-
cated earlier, a- nonprofit organization must be nonpolitical
to qualify as tax exempt under provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code. Certain politically oriented activities by
these Community Action Agencies continued after formation
of the JSC and became identified with the JSC. As a result,
the Governor of Kentucky successfully opposed a refunding
x
request from JSC in June, 1970. One analysis indicated
that some of the JSC board members, representing their local
CAA, were heavily involved in political maneuvers, and
their interests were not "as broad or as noble as might
Office of Economic Opportunity, "Highlight Memo-
randum, " summary of 1969 JSC program under Title I-D of
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, as amended),
Washington, D.C., 1970.
2Job Start Corporation, "Application for Continu-
ation, " Appendix B.




be wished." However, with experience and understanding of
the goals and constraints of the Community Development
Corporations funded by the Economic Opportunity Act, this
problem has almost disappeared, and such opposition is now
infrequent.
Accounting and Accountants
Yet another factor which has plagued the new venture
experience of JSC has been the lack of adequate accounting
and cost systems as well as the inability to attract
2
accountants with manufacturing experience. The establish-
ment of manufacturing accounting controls, particularly in
inventory, generated substantial problems in producing
accurate financial statements. This problem was not
resolved completely for the first three years of Possum
Trot's operation, and is only now nearing resolution at
4Lawson Furniture, almost four years after startup.
Office of Economic Opportunity, "Monthly Report
on the Job Start Corporation," memorandum from the program
analyst for JSC, [about November, 1971].
2Ibid. ; and Job Start Corporation, letter from
Executive Director to Office of Economic Development,
November, 24, 1972.
^Job Start Corporation, "Proposal for Refunding,
1973 through 1975," p. 13.
Interview with Thomas Miller, Executive Director,
Job Start Corporation, London, Kentucky, held in Washing-





The four-stage strategy for venture selection and
development has demonstrated a limited capability to foster
community economic development. The foreclosure from the
impact area of outside entrepreneurial talent and associated
capital has eliminated a possible source of venture
development and resulting community economic development.
Recognizing the limitations of the original venture
strategy, JSC officials elected to work with two would-be
entrepreneurs who had participated in an IFED new enterprise
workshop. It will be remembered from chapter I that the
workshop is designed to locate and assist entrepreneurs
interested in establishing businesses with projected sales
potential of over Si million annually. The results of JSC
experience with two such entrepreneurs are presented in
greater detail later in this section and again in a subsequent
chapter. Suffice it to say at this point that the experience
has led JSC to accept the entrepreneurial search approach
as an appropriate and attractive mode of venture
establishment.
The JSC, however, is continuing the evolution in
venture selection and establishment strategy. There are
advantages in attracting outside entrepreneurial talent
and capital to the Southeastern Kentucky impact area. But
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JSC recognizes the desirability of developing potential
local entrepreneurs who may have the requisite personal
characteristics, ability, and aptitude. If these exist in
local individuals, then all that is lacking is capital
investment and continuing technical assistance, both of *
which JSC can provide.
These considerations have led JSC to develop what
is referred to as a "mini-INED" concept. The goals of this
program would be to identify and support local potential
entrepreneurs whose financial goals are for businesses
which would have net annual sales of $500,000 or less.
The process would have four phases:
1. Find and screen candidates. An initial pool of
fifty to seventy-five potential entrepreneurs
would result.
2. Conduct a generalized workshop for these candi-
dates to identify the demands, difficulties, and
rewards of being an entrepreneur. Analyze
strengths and weaknesses of the individual and
provide him with appropriate feedback.
3. Conduct a second workshop to provide further
information to the individual regarding his
strengths and weaknesses as a second-stage
analysis. Provide training in specific areas
such as marketing, interpersonal skills, finance,
and venture analysis in the light of individual
strengths and weaknesses.
4-. Select individuals and ventures for one-on-one
support in producing a business plan, including
funding requirements and sources. JSC, of course,
Job Start Corporation, "A Proposal for an Entre-
preneur Identification and Support Program" (Draft), London,
Kentucky, [about February, 1975], p. 2. (Mimeographed.;
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would be a prime source for such financial support
but such support might be found in outside, non-
governmental, sources.
1
It is apparent that the philosophy embodied in this
program contains a combination of the two approaches to
venture establishment. Development of local persons as
entrepreneurs and financial support provided by JSC repre-
sent community resource rationalization. The search for
potentially talented entrepreneurs is concentrated in the
local area but is only a variation of the entrepreneurial
search approach. The apparent willingness to seek outside
sources of financing, in addition to that provided by the
JSC and other local sources, is evidence also of a broadening
of the community resource rationalization approach.
The program also presents a possible answer to the
problem of community leadership vacuums contributing to
the difficulty of community organizing efforts by JSC. In
an interview with the president of the Possum Trot Corpora-
tion, it was stated that out-migration trends must be
halted and reversed if talented people are to remain in or
2
return to this Appalachian area. The opportunities for
local entrepreneurship may provide the impetus for reversing




2Interview with Richard Martin, President, Possum
Trot Corporation, in McKee, Kentucky, February 25, 1975-
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additional potential political and community- leaders in or
to the area.
Profitability
The present attitude toward venture profitability
seems well-defined. As an example, two of the three manu-
facturing sites under the Possum Trot Corporation have
recently been closed because they were an economic drain
on the corporation as a whole. According to the president
of Possum Trot Corporation, the decision to close was based
purely on business considerations and was made by the
venture management and venture board of directors. The
feeling was that the community was able to accept the
closures without their reflecting adversely on the JSC or
on its goals. The idea of continuing a business as a
purely social enterprise on a subsidized basis was rejected,
at least for the short term. This is in line with the OED
policy regarding venture profitability.
Summary
The philosophical development seems to be one which
began at the idealistic end of the continuum, where social
goals are paramount, and moves to a point where social and
economic goals are viewed discretely. Movement now appears
to be on a course where the best of both extremes will be
Office of Economic Development, "Policy Statement




rationalized into a more complete approach to community
economic development.
Growth of JSC
This section provides a "brief overview of JSC growth
in order that a perspective may be gained regarding the
dimensions of JSC activity. The development of four firms
which are of interest to this study is presented in narrative
form. A succeeding chapter presents detailed financial and
trend data together with a comparative analysis of the
performance of the six firms providing the basis for this
study.
Lawson Furniture
The Knox County Community Development Corporation
established Lawson Furniture as two divisions in 1970. One
division upholstered wooden frames manufactured by the other.
The two divisions merged into Lawson Furniture in 1971* At
the time the merger was noted to OEL, in the third Quarterly
Monitoring Report, 1971? Lawson listed $64,000 in assets.
Through its affiliation with JSC, the Knox County
CDC has received $520,000 in investment capital through
1974. The JSC is not involved in the operation or management
of Lawson but acts largely as a funnel of SIP funds to
Unless otherwise noted, material for this section
was developed from respective JSC Quarterly Monitoring
Reports submitted to the Office of Economic Development
during the period 1970 through 1974.
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Lawson through the Knox County CDC. The JSC- also includes
Lawson and other Knox County CDC activity and financial
reports in its Quarterly Monitoring Report to OED.
The Knox County CDC and the affiliated CAA, the Knox
County Economic Opportunity Council, also receive funding
directly from other government agencies, including other
than SIP funds from OEO. Among these have been substantial
manpower training funds which have in effect subsidized
Lawson Furniture operations to a greater extent than other
ventures included in this study.
The firm was established through the four-stage
community resource rationalization approach described
earlier. Its growth has been substantial, but its fortunes
are largely tied to those of the housing industry. Fourth
Quarter 1974- and First Quarter 1975 indicate a substantial
slowdown in sales volume. Additionally, a $250,000 grant
from JSC for planned expansion is being held by the Knox
County CDC because of economic uncertainties in the current
furniture market.
Possum Trot Corporation
The Possum Trot Corporation began as three separate
manufacturing activities, each organized in a different
county within the impact area. All three were developed in




the four-phase community resource rationalization model
outlined earlier.
Rockcastle Wood Products
Rockcastle Wood Products began producing wooden
backyard utility barns in April, 1970, in a garage in
Rockcastle County, employing four men. Plans were drawn
for its liquidation by Possum Trot in early 1973* At its
peak, employment reached only five, and it was a marginal
operation from the beginning. The JSC invested a total of
$34-> 700 in the three years of its existence. The decision
to liquidate was based on purely economic grounds as
2discussed earlier m this chapter.
East Lake Industries
East Lake Industries began operations with two
subdivisions in March, 1970. The Wood and Metal Division
was established in an old movie theater in McCreary County.
The primary product was pickup truck campers. This venture
was short-lived and ceased operations in September, 1971*
The Fabric Division of East Lake Industries was a
"cut-and-sew" operation, making children's stuffed toys in
a rented grocery store, also in McCreary County. The
initial products were designed by a consultant, Selengut
Associates, as part of a children's environmental line.
1Ibid.
2See above, p. 115.
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At its peak, employment reached about twenty. The JSC
invested a total of $31,650 in this division of East Lake
Industries. It was combined with Rockcastle Wood Products
and Mountain Toymakers (discussed next) to form Possum Trot
Corporation in January, 1973.
Mountain Toymakers
Production began in mid-September, 1970, in two back
rooms of the Jackson County CAA offices. The products,
children's stuffed toy animals, were designed, as for East
Lake Industries, by Selengut Associates. In January, 1971
>
employment was placed at twelve and was up to twenty-one
by April, 1973. The JSC invested a total of $189,000 in
Mountain Toymakers.
Combined organization
The Possum Trot Corporation was initially estab-
lished in mid-1972 as a combined marketing organization for
the three divisions described above. This organization
replaced an early arrangement with Selengut Associates
whereby Selengut acted as agent for JSC in establishing
sales representatives to market the combined output of the
three divisions. The three divisions were formally brought
together as Possum Trot Corporation, a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of JSC, in January, 1973. As indicated above,
Rockcastle Wood Products was terminated shortly thereafter.
East Lake Industries (Fabric Division) was closed in late
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October, 19 7^-, and remained closed as o.f the end of February,
1975* The decision to close the two operations was based
strictly on business reasons, as indicated elsewhere. The
highly labor intensive production operation is now located
in a single facility in Jackson County. At the end of
September, 197^? total employment at Possum Trot was seventy-
one. However, employment was down to thirty-one at the end
of December, 1974- • Total investment in the Possum Trot
Corporation—including those made in Rockcastle Wood Products,
East Lake Industries, and Mountain Toymakers before they
combined—is $39^,200.
In the financial analysis which follows in a
subsequent chapter, the Possum Trot Corporation is
considered from April 1, 1971, when the three firms
entered stage III of the development process described
earlier.
Outdoor Venture Corporation
The Outdoor Venture Corporation (OVC) is the first
of two business firms formed with JSC assistance through
the entrepreneurial search approach. OVC manufactures and
markets low-priced, medium-quality camping tents and
accessories through discount stores and other sporting goods
retailers. The company was formed in August, 1972, by two
entrepreneurs who invested $130,000, and JSC, which invested
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$100,000 in common stock and $120,000 in convertible deben-
tures. The company is located in Stearns, a small mining
town in McCreary County.
A brief discussion of the entrepreneurial search
as it relates to OVC will provide an operational definition
of its process and how it has been used by JSC.
The two principals were located by an IKED Associate
through a member of a Knoxville, Tennessee, financial con-
sulting firm. Subsequently, their entrepreneurial abilities
and management skills were evaluated through an entrepre-
neurial workshop conducted by the INED staff. As one of
the principals described it, the workshop was successful in
demonstrating the participants' strengths and weaknesses
and in pointing out areas of potential difficulty. A business
plan was constructed, evaluated, and modified with INED's
assistance and then presented to JSC for assessment as a
possible venture capitalist. An agreement was then negoti-
ated to satisfy JSC objectives as well as those of the
p
entrepreneur.
As in all JSC debenture purchases (and SVCDF
debenture purchases, to be discussed in the next chapter),
the intent is equity and not debt. The debentures were used
as a device to provide ownership and control to the entre-
preneurs while still protecting JSC objectives. Debenture
purchases will, accordingly, be treated as equity in the
analysis presented in a subsequent chapter.
2Interview with J. C. Egnew, President of OVC, in
Stearns, Kentucky, February 24-, 1975.

122
Although the venture agreement is considered
proprietary information and was not made available to this
researcher, discussions with participants have indicated
the general outline which the agreement may have followed.
The concepts of ownership and control are primary issues.'
The concepts are most important, but they are separable.
Ownership defines uhe division of the gain while
control defines the division of management responsibilities.
By accepting a minority position, JSC gave the entrepreneurs
both majority ownership and control. However, by the terms
of debenture convertibility, entrepreneur performance and
actions must remain within certain boundaries or the
debentures convert to equity at JSC option. As examples,
such conditions probably include a minimum sales-profit
performance, agreement to remain within the impact area,
and local hire to the maximum feasible extent. Through such
attached conditions, JSC is content with a protected minority
position while not having to cope with the problems of either
management or ownership. The JSC investment, however, is
clearly intended as equity.
Phoenix Products, Incorporated
The second firm established through the entrepre-
neurial search approach commenced operations on November 1,
Interviews with Brian Haslett, INED Associate, in
Belmont, Mass., September 9, 1974- ; and Egnew, OVC.
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1973. The entrepreneurs were brought" together with JSC
through the IKED workshop process. The financing provided
by JSC under the venture agreement is similar to that
provided to OVC. The agreement negotiated with Phoenix
is also probably similar to the OVC-JSC agreement, with
similar safeguards for the minority position.
Phoenix Products is located in Jackson County, about
ten miles from the present Possum Trot facilities. The
product line includes four models of fiberglass kayaks.
The JSC investment was $50,000 in common stock and $55 > 000
in convertible debentures.
The initial experiences of Phoenix Products were
most frustrating and discouraging. Delays in obtaining OED
approval of the venture meant missing part of the first
year's potential in sales in a seasonal market. Orders
taken in anticipation of early approval could not be filled
on time. The firm was branded with a reputation for poor
delivery before it began operations. Both entrepreneurs
were incapacitated through illness or injury throughout
substantial periods of the first year when, typically,
decisions and changing conditions are critical to the
survival of a young firm. The unanswered question which
arises in discussion of Phoenix is whether the venture would
have survived without the personal commitment of the entre-
preneurs. Now in its second year of operation, Phoenix
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Products is projected to increase its sales volume substan-
tially and to attain the break-even point.
Other Activities
Appendix B provides a pictorial representation of
the development and growth of JSC activities. Included is
a brief description of ventures and other projects which
are not of direct interest to this research.
The JSC capital investment in the economic develop-
ment of its impact area through December 31? 1974- , is
summarized in table 9-
TABLE 9
JSC CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN IMPACT AREA ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH DECEMBER 31, 1974
(in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal Year
1971 1972 1973 197^ 1975 Total
Possum Trot 79-0 132.6 169-7 12.9 39^-2
Lawson Furniture 50.0 220.0 250.0 520.0
Outdoor Venture 220.0 220.0
Phoenix Products 105.0 105-0
Other 4-0.0 67-4- 0.5 107-9
Total 129.0 172.6 677-1 118.4 250.0 1,34-7-1
SOURCE: Job Start Corporation, "CDC Investments in
Ventures," 0E0 Form 293, as submitted to 0E0 in the Quarterly




This chapter has presented a philosophical hack-
ground and activity summary to illustrate the evolution of
the JSC approach to venture establishment. Movement from
sole reliance on the community resource rationalization
approach to apparently complete reliance on the entre-
preneurial search approach, followed by modification of the
latter to effect a combination of the two approaches, has
been described. The next chapter provides similar treatment
of the Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund and is
followed by a comparative analysis of trend and other data
relating to venture economic performance.

CHAPTER V
THE SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA COMMUNITY
DEVELOPMENT FUND
Introduction
This chapter presents the second case study of a
CDC from which ventures were selected for study. The
development of the physical and philosophical settings for
the Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund closely
follows the presentation pattern of chapter IV.
Background
The Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund
(SVCDE) impact area offers a number of contrasts as well as
similarities to that served by the Job Start Corporation.
It is classified by the 0E0 as a rural CDC (as is Job Start)
and employs a strategy of community economic development
which is basically compatible with other rural CDCs.
However, of the three geographical areas included in the
impact area (see fig. 5)j one is urban and two are rural.
The urban area population is predominantly black and the
rural areas are overwhelmingly white.
The northwest section of Roanoke City (Census
Tracts 7 and 8, plus parts of six other census tracts)
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in I960, a ratio which changed to 77 percent black and
23 percent white in 1970.^ Unemployment was estimated by
the Roanoke City Planning Department in 1970 as approaching
33 percent. Many of those who are employed found their
employment outside the community, with few of the economic
benefits flowing back into the community. Fully 29 percent
of those employed in Census Tracts 7 a*id 8 in 1970 were
employed as private household or service workers.
Craig County is rural and mountainous. Although
unemployment approximated that of the state of Virginia in
1970 (3*5 percent versus 3*0 percent), it is significant
to note that 59 percent of those employed worked outside
their county of residence. This is well above the overall
.
. 6Virginia figures. No dentists, one doctor, and only two
Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund,
"Proposal for Special Impact Funds," Blue Ridge, Virginia,
April 4, 1969, p. 10.
2Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund,
"Draft Proposal Application for Refunding of Special Impact
Funds," Roanoke, Virginia, October 13, 1972, sec. III.
3Stewart Lichtman, "Southwest Virginia Community
Development Fund," Washington, D.C., n.d., p. 2. (Mimeographed.)
U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census,
Census of Population and Housing, 1970- Census Tracts, Final
Report PHC (1)-17^, RoanokeT"Virginia SMSA
, Table P-3.
5U.S., Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census,
County and City Data Book, 1972: A Statistical Abstract
Supplement




nonretail businesses (a sand and gravel plant and a pajama
manufacturer) were doing business in the county in 1969.
Craig County lies within the Jefferson National Forest and
has only marginal agricultural activity and capability.
Botetourt County is rural and unindustriaiized and
is rapidly becoming a bedroom community for Roanoke.
Original residents are leaving the county because of the
rising costs of living which accompany suburban development.
Unemployment is not high because of out-migration, but, as
is frequently the case, those remaining behind lack salable
skills and live in rural poverty. The out-migration poses
a problem to nearby urban Roanoke because many of the
2
migrants have gone there as the closest urban area.
Table 10 summarizes pertinent demographic data,
while figure 5 (p. 127) provides a geographic perspective
for the impact area.
Philosophy of Business
Venture Establishment
In early 1969, the major anti-poverty program in
Roanoke was a Department of Labor-sponsored manpower
training program under the supervision of an Opportunity
Industrialization Center (OIC). The OIC, in turn, acted
Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund,
"Proposal for Special Impact Funds, pp. 19-22.
2Office of Economic Development, "Southwest Virginia
Community Development Fund—Briefing," Washington, D.C.,
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Report PHC(l)-17*t, Roanoke, Virginia SMSA
,
Tables P-I , P-2, P-3;
Botetourt and Craig County data: Idem, County and City Data Book, 1972 :
A Statistical Abstract Supplement
,
Table 2;
Virginia data: Idem, Census of Population, 1970 ; Final Report PC(l)-
CkS Virginia , Table 124.
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under the direction of the local Community Action Agency,
Total Action Against Poverty (TAP). In the late spring
of 1969, TAP submitted a successful application for Special
Impact Funds to establish a community development corporation,
the Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund, intended
to serve the impact area of Northwest Roanoke, Craig, and
2
Botetourt Counties.
The goals of the new CDC were generally to create -
income producing businesses and conduct needed social
programs in the impact area. Maximum resident and business
involvement was to be encouraged, and control vested in a
broad-based board, representative of the participants.
Real participation of residents in decision making and the
financial investment process was considered essential.
The composition of the board of directors provides
an indication of the desire for broad community participation
and community control. Of the twenty-eight members, four
were to represent Northwest Roanoke; three, Botetourt County;
and one, Craig County. The remaining twenty were to repre-
sent existing service and professional organizations in the
area, such as NAACP, YMCA, and Chambers of Commerce.
Lichtman, "Southwest Virginia Community Development
Fund, "p. 3.
2Center for Community Economic Development, Newsletter
,
July 15, 1972, pp. 2-10.
3^Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund,







The decision process regarding business venture
establishment was divided into three areas of responsibility;
1. Ideas for projects could originate in any part of
the organization. However, each community, through
proposed general membership organizations, was
specifically encouraged to develop ideas based on
the peculiar needs, interests, and resources of its
members and area.
2. Setting of priorities for feasibility studies of
project proposals submitted was the responsibility
of the board of directors. Again, the influence
of the communities and involvement in their own
development is apparent.
3. The SVCDF staff was either to conduct the feasibility
study or to monitor the performance of a consultant
conducting the study. The staff and the board would
then have the task of making the final decision, but
not without substantial community involvement. 1
It is worthy of note at this point that the process
described in the initial proposal has remained substantially
unchanged in the six-year history of SVCDF. The desire for
community control and involvement is clearly illustrated in
the concept and the way it was implemented. The two SVCDF
business enterprises to be studied in the present research,
Gainsborough Electrical Manufacturing Company and Botetourt
Cabinet Corporation, evolved along the decision line
indicated. Development of both ventures required the
rationalization of community resources.
Affiliated Community Organizations
The desire and intent to foster community involvement




mentioned goals and their implementation through, a board of
directors drawn from community organizations. The SVCDF
actively encouraged the formation of general membership
organizations representing the poor and disadvantaged of
each of the sub-areas it served. As noted, these organiza-
tions were considered a prime source of ideas for projects
designed to foster community economic development.
The original funding request to 0E0 contained only
one enterprise proposal, an electrical wiring harness
manufacturer. This proposal was not fully developed at the
time, and substantial additional planning was required
before it could be implemented. The newly formed, small
SVCDF staff and representatives of the General Electric
Company (Salem) who were assisting in development of the
new venture were all inexperienced in the problems and
process of new business startup. Therefore, the company
was not formed until August, 1970, and operations were not
begun until September.
The problems and delay experienced in creating
visible results had a similar, concurrent effect on community
organizing efforts. However, with the commencement of
operations by the wiring harness manufacturer, a credible
program and image were established. At this time, only a
Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund,







single community general membership organization was in
existence, the Craig Improvement Association. The
Botetourt Improvement Association was formed in March,
1971* The third general membership organization, the
Community Organization for Research and Development, was
formed in the summer of 1972 by the residents of Northwest
2Roanoke.
The SVCDF has considered several variations of a
plan to place ownership of the business ventures in the
hands of the general membership organizations. The final
version was described in the latest refunding proposal.
It proposed the creation of a for-profit holding company,
the Southwest Virginia Community Development Corporation
(SVCDC). All of the stock in the ventures would he trans-
ferred from the nonprofit SVCDF to the new, for-profit
SVCDC. Twenty percent of the stock in each venture would
then be transferred to the general membership organization
in whose area the venture was established. Another 10 per-
cent of the stock would be set aside for venture manager-
employee incentive programs. The remaining 70 percent of
the stock would be retained by the holding company.
Through this device, further community involvement and
Lichtman, "Southwest Virginia Community Development
Fund," p. 6.
2Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund,




a sense of ownership and commitment should result.
Development of the SVCDF hoard, cooperation between
the staff and affiliated general membership organizations,
commonality of purpose, and direction have all been slow in
coming. Among the obstacles were slow development of leader-
ship in the community and a feeling that the venture should
back the community instead of the community backing the
venture. Although the community controlled the ventures
through the board of directors, an understanding of the
responsibility, authority, use, and power of that control
2
was slow m developing.
Although venture stock is to be transferred to the
general membership organizations, the present state of
those ventures indicates that their self-sufficiency is at
best a long-range goal. Little in the way of profit distri-
bution is likely to accrue to the general membership
organizations soon. For the foreseeable future at least,
the general membership organizations must continue to rely
on SVCDF for both monetary and personnel support. However,
they will continue to provide ideas for community development
Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund,
"Application for Refunding of Special Impact Funds, Febru-
ary 1, 1975—January 31, 1977," Roanoke, Virginia,
November 26, 1974-, sec. Ill, pp. 30-35.
2Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund,
"Draft Proposal Application," sec. II.
5
^Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund, >
"Application for Refunding," sec. II, p. 12.
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projects, assessment of community need, and 'availability of
important resources for development.
All three general membership organizations were
incorporated in 197^ • It is interesting to note that non-
profit status was not indicated in the incorporation papers,
leaving open the option of politically oriented activity.
Federal Funding
The SVCDF is considered a rural CDC despite the fact
that one part of its impact area is urban. Table 11 provides
a tabulation of funding provided to SVCDF under the Special
Impact Program. For comparative purposes, totals for rural
CDCs are also provided. Funds are indicated in the fiscal
year received, although expenditure may occur throughout a
program period exceeding one fiscal year. Venture and
administrative fund expenditures are also indicated to provide
a perspective on the relative size and division of effort in
the SVCDF program.
Board of Directors
The original concept for board of director member-
ship provided that twenty, of the twenty-eight members would
come from established community service and professional
organizations. Not all such organizations invited to
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ownership and accompanying growth in vested interest and
control within the general membership organizations, the
role for other community organizations on the board of
directors is greatly diminished. As a result, current
membership on the SVCDF Board is limited to representation
of the three general membership organizations. Community
service organizations may attain representation through
the general membership organizations if desired.
Other Problems
Management and entrepreneurial skills are normally
developed in the course of training, education, and work
experience. Such skills were largely nonexistent within
the three communities. Committed as it was to community
resource rationalization in business venture establishment,
the shortage of such skills within the community presented
difficult problems to SVCDF and to its ventures. Managers
from within the community were hired and essentially trained
on the Job. Similarly, no available reservoir of skills
existed among the members of the community work force.
Since one of the goals of SVCDF is the creation of jobs for
local residents, development of manual and technical skills
p
also had to occur on the job. Import of such resources
1Ibid.
2Office of Economic Development, "Southwest Virginia
Community Development Fund—Briefing," pp. 36-37.
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from outside the community was simply not compatible with
«.
the goals and objectives of the SVCDF. This factor was to
plague the operations of the electrical wiring manufacturer,
as will be discussed in a later section.
An Evolving Philosophy
Venture Selection
In describing their goals and objectives for the
two-year funding period beginning February 1, 1975, the Staff
and Board of Directors of SVCDF appear to be subtly changing
emphasis. The overall, general goal of community control
remains, but its definition of community control seems to
be undergoing rethinking. The sub-goals relating to venture
development and community development also remain, but the
approach to achieving them seems also to be changing.
Previous activities and procedures in establishing
ventures have emphasized community involvement and control.
For example, community organizations have served as prime
sources of ideas for new ventures. Substantial staff and
board time are devoted to deliberations and decisions related
to these suggestions. While this will continue, added
emphasis may be expected on selection of projects which show
economic promise but may originate from other sources.
Community development and involvement will continue to be
important but may be expected to be viewed somewhat more
distinctly from venture or business goals.' That success
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in meeting the broader goals depends to a great extent on
attainment of venture development goals is a conclusion
that seems to have become central.
Conversations with the executive director indicate
that complete reliance on community resource rationalization
with accompanying total ownership may not be the only SVCDF
strategy in future venture selection and development. Should
a promising venture and entrepreneur come along, an appropri-
ately protected and defined minority position could be quite
acceptable to the SVCDF staff and board of directors as
being well within the boundaries of community control.
Whether SVCDF philosophy has evolved to the point where the
CDC would actively engage in entrepreneurial search as the
Job Start Corporation does is a question which remains to
be answered.
Profitability
The new emphasis on venture profitability and
self-sustenance appears to derive from the conviction that
profits are essential to the achievement of the broader goals,
Only through sustained profits can venture growth be expected,
Numbers of jobs and training opportunities will increase as
a direct result, contributing directly to the achievement of
Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund,
"Application for Refunding," sec. V, pp. 16-17.
2Interview with Thomas Morse, Executive Director,
Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund, in Roanoke,





community economic development. The emphasis on venture
profitability appears to be consonant with the stated OED
policy of short-term profit maximization as a goal for CDC
ventures.
The decision sequence, responsibility, and criteria
for closing a business and terminating an investment are
further indications of the developing philosophy regarding
venture profitability. An examination of financial data
contained in a later section of this study shows that at
least one of the SVCDF ventures is experiencing difficulties,
Decisions will soon have to be made regarding its future.
Should the decision be made to terminate, it will be made
almost exclusively on the economic viability of the venture.
The board of directors of the firm to be terminated will be
at the primary decision level, but the SVCDP, as 100 percent
owner, will be directly involved. The executive director
of SVCDE firmly believes that the board members are suffi-
ciently committed to the concept of venture profitability
as a prerequisite to community development that economic
viability will be the determinant rather than any purely
social concept or commitment. He also believes that the
community understands the need for economic success in its
Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund,
"Application for Refunding," sec. II, p. 11.
2Office of Economic Development, "Policy Statement
on Special Impact Program," p. 9-
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ventures. This does not alter the fact that any such closure
would be a major setback but is an indicator that the com-
munity is now resilient enough to accept such an event and
will not withdraw its support of SVCDF as a result.
Summary
The picture which emerges is one of movement along
a philosophical continuum from a point where idealistic
solutions were sought in response to real-world problems,
toward a point where compromise is possible and where situ-
ations do not require a 0,1 response. An additional wide
range of possibilities for investment is being explored
along with other activities, which might not have been
considered three years ago.
Growth of SVCDF
In this section, a brief overview of SVCDF growth and
development is presented to provide a perspective on the
types and dimensions of activity in which it has engaged. A
more detailed narrative is presented of the two ventures that
are of particular interest to this study, Gainsborough Elec-
trical Manufacturing Company (GEMCO) and Botetourt Cabinet
Corporation (BCC). The next chapter presents detailed
financial and trend data together with a comparative analysis
of the business performance of the six firms providing the
basis for this study, including GEMCO and BCC.




The original funding request for Special Impact Funds
as submitted by the Community Action Agency provided for the
formation of an electrical wiring harness manufacturer.
Assistance was provided by the General Electric Company (GE)
(Salem, Virginia, division) in development of the business
plan. Acceptance and funding by OED was influenced in part
by GE's agreement to become a major purchaser of the output
of the new firm. Progress after funding, however, was slow.
An SVCDF staff had to be formed to conduct all of the
activities envisioned in the community economic development
plan, including the venture establishment. The executive
director was not hired until October, 1969. Neither the
newly formed SVCDF staff nor the GE personnel involved had
had extensive experience in venture startup. Therefore,
it was September, 1970, fifteen months after initial 0E0
funding, before operations commenced at the GEMCO facility.
The initial SVCDF investment in GEMCO totaled
$47,000. Total investment by SVCDF through December, 1974,
was $375,200. This amount includes a recent investment of
$75,000 toward the development of a plastic injection molding
capability to be developed in calendar year 1975.
Unless otherwise noted, material for this section
was developed from the respective SVCDF Quarterly Monitoring
Reports submitted to the Office of Economic Development




The primary investment instrument used by SVCDE is
a three-year convertible, renewable debenture. The intention
of SVCDF is that the debenture represent capital investment
and not long-term debt. " Equity carried on the balance
sheet since formation of the company totals $40,700, but the
amount treated as equity in the analysis presented in the
next chapter includes SVCDE debentures as investment capital
rather than debt.
A major goal of GEMCO has been the development of
substantial sales to customers other than GE. However,
throughout its four-and-a-half-year history, sales by GEMCO
to GE have averaged between 65 aud 75 percent of the annual
totals. Other customers have included IBM, Sperry-Marine,
and Western Electric.
Among the serious problems encountered by GEMCO
have been quality control and management information system
development. As an example of quality control problems, in
January, 1974, Western Electric returned $2,800 worth of
harnesses on which the harness wiring had been damaged during
the stripping operation of fabrication. This one lapse
ultimately led to the scrapping of about eighty harnesses
and a $9,600 loss in February, 1974, alone. The institution
of proper controls and inspections resulted in a net loss of
$20 per harness on subsequent Western Electric production.
"'"Interview with Morse, SVCDF,
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In mid-1973? an error was found in finished goods
and work-in-process inventories which had produced over-
statement of profits throughout the year. Both problems
are not uncommon in new, small businesses.
GEMCO began its operations with twenty-one employees
in September, 1970, and employment exceeded sixty by the end
of 1974. Sales (net in current dollars) grew from about
$75,000 in its first full year of operation to about $517,000
in the fiscal year ending July 31, 1974. A $25,000 bank
line of credit has been arranged through the pledging of
specific receivables.
Botetourt Cabinet Corporation
Planning for the second major venture by SVCDF
began in January, 1970, with an original target for commence-
ment of operations of July, 1971* The Botetourt Cabinet
Corporation was formed to produce low-cost, medium quality
kitchen cabinets for new housing construction, using an
assembly clip device which would allow easy assembly of
components at installation sites. Ironically, the potential
of the clip device was never fully realized, and cabinet
shipments have been in fully-assembled condition.
Initial SVCEF investment was set at $200,000, with
a group of six local Roanoke banks investing $280,000 under
Interview with Richard M. Long, Director of Business
Planning and Research, SVCDF, at the Botetourt Cabinet
Corporation, Fincastle, Virginia, February 27, 1975*
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SBA guarantee of 90 percent. The financing arrangements
were almost complete by July, 1971, "but difficulties in
obtaining 0E0 approval of feasibility and market studies
caused substantial delays. A new building was constructed
in rural Botetourt County near Fincastle, and operations
finally commenced in September, 1972. Initial SVGBF invest-
ment by that time had risen to $270,000. The SVCL11 investment
through 197^ totals $545,000. SVCDF investment instruments
in BCC are renewable, convertible debentures, but are
treated as capital investment in the analysis which follows
in the next chapter.
Management information system errors were found
in BCC records in mid-1973- Understatement of Cost of Goods
Sold resulted in overstatement of profits in BCC's first
several months of operation. A similar problem appeared in
early 1974-
.
Perhaps the most serious problem faced by BCC has
been a negative cash flow, first reported in October, 1973.
At the end of March, 1974, cash available was $17,000
against a goal of $160,000. In July, 1974, cash on hand
was reported as $28,400 against a goal of $211,800. At the
end of the fiscal year, November 30, 1974, cash on hand had
fallen to $1,400. Several factors contributed to this
situation. The rapidly rising cost of materials throughout
1974 found BCC using Kigher-cost materials in fulfillment
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of contracts consummated earlier and based on lower
materials costs. Additionally, the average age of accounts
receivable increased rapidly to 75*7 days by October, 1974-
,
against a goal of 63 days. The depressed condition of the
housing industry is in some degree responsible for this
increase and has prompted BCC to enter the replacement and
repair market for kitchen cabinets.
BCC began its operations with twenty-three employees
and had twenty-eight at the end of November, 1974- • Its
first-year sales were $379,000, and second-year sales
$702,4-00 (net at current dollars). As with all SYCDF
ventures, almost all employees were recruited from the
impact area.
Other Activities
Appendix C provides a pictorial representation of
the development and growth of SVCD'F activities. Included
is a brief description of ventures and other efforts
which are not of direct interest to this study.
Table 12 summarizes SVCDF capital investment in




This chapter has provided a philosophical background
and activity summary to demonstrate the application of




SVCDF CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN IMPACT AREA ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT THROUGH DECEMBER 51, 1974
(in thousands of dollars)
Fiscal Year








102.0 78.2 20.0 175.0 375.2




15.0 I3.O 35.0 17.0 80.0
117.0 405-7 48.0 556.5 342.0 1,469.2
SOURCE: Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund,
"CDC Loans and Loan Guarantees—Loans and/or Loan Guarantees
Outstanding," 0E0 Form 294, as submitted to the 0E0 in the
Quarterly Monitoring Report for the years 1970 through 1974.
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achievement of its community development goals. The next
chapter presents a comparative analysis of the economic
performance of ventures generated under the entrepreneurial







Previous chapters have established the existence of
variations in approach to the achievement of community
development. These variations rest largely on concepts of
community control and the degree to which business ventures
established to foster community development must be subject
to such control. The two approaches to business venture
establishment which are of interest to this study reflect
the conflict among mixed objectives— social, political, and
economic.
In this chapter, data gathered as described in
chapter I are presented and analyzed in order to provide
answers to the subsidiary research questions, which in turn
will support an answer to the primary research question:
Are there differences in the economic performance of rural
Community Development Corporation manufacturing ventures
established through the entrepreneurial search approach
and those established under the community resource
rationalization approach?
To this end, the presentation of results is





is presented in a separate section to be developed as
follows:
1. Statement of the subsidiary question
2. Specific performance measure definitions
3>. Data presentation, analysis, and conclusions
relating to the subsidiary question
The discussion of the subsidiary questions is
prefaced by a brief examination of data collection results
and a restatement of the methodology as introduced in
chapter I. The subsidiary question discussion is followed
by a synthesis of answers to the subsidiary questions
which will support conclusions regarding the primary
research question.
Data Collection
As indicated earlier, two visits to each CDC site
were required to supplement and validate data gathered at
OED. Neither source alone would have been adequate to
support the study.
Primary reliance for basic financial information
was placed on audited statements. For BCC, GEMCO, OVC, and
Phoenix, the audits were readily available and provided
sound basic information. However, only two annual audits
for Lawson Furniture could be found and original financial
data were not made available. Consequently, the financial
picture was reconstructed through a detailed examination
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of quarterly reports submitted to OED, new product or
expansion feasibility reports, refunding proposals, and
correspondence files. The picture thus constructed was
reconciled with the audits that were available.
Possum Trot posed a minor problem in that audited
statements were available for all but six months of its
life. These periods were reconstructed much as Lawson
records were. They were then adjusted to reflect a 197^
change in fiscal year, to end on March 31 rather than
December 31.
Data regarding the level of CDC Technical Assistance
provided to the ventures were in some cases incomplete.
Where it was necessary, the data were estimated (with the
assistance of CDC personnel) en the basis of the amount of
CDC administrative funds expended, the amounts of technical
assistance provided other firms, the stage of life of the
firm (i.e., startup, first year, etc.), and the narrative
of CDC staff and venture activity provided in the monitoring
report.
Government manpower training subsidies were not
always listed separately on financial statements but were
simply included as other income. In these situations, the
subsidies were estimated or apportioned from other records.
As is to be expected in a research study, collection




Supporting data are included in appendix D.
Methodology
Data tabulations which follow are presented by
venture and by the chronological age of the venture operation.
This display facilitates the comparison of performance data
for ventures of the same chronological age. The reader is
referred to figure 2 (page 19), which illustrates the life
span of the ventures studied. It indicates the calendar
year, the fiscal year, and the chronological age for the
venture operation. Also shown are the sponsoring CDC and
the approach used in establishment of the venture. The
reader is reminded that this study does not attempt to
assign interval or ratio levels of quantification to the
results of indicated venture performance. Rather, interpre-
tation relies on trends and differences noted through
performance comparison at the same venture age and on extrapo-
lations based on past and current performance and future
projections to provide a statement of ordinal quantification
with regard to ventures and measures used.
The general limitations of the data are again
recognized. Of the two entrepreneurial search ventures,
one has been in existence for two years and the other for
only one year. However, the subject matter is time sensitive
for the reasons indicated in chapter I, and if performance
and performance-related strategy differences can be
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identified, then the study and its conclusions can have an
important effect on program administration.
Only ratios are presented for comparative purposes.
Data used for ratio computation may be found in Appendix D.
Finally, figure 6 provides an initial comparison of
the ventures, in both size and growth in terms of annual
sales (1971 dollars). It should be noted that Lawson and
GEMCO have experienced sixfold sales volume increases over
four years of operation while Possum Trot sales have more
than doubled in its four-year life. BCC sales increased by
two-thirds and OVC sales by one-third in their second year
of operation. Projections for the current fiscal year,
however, show a reduction in sales growth rate for all
ventures except OVC and Phoenix, both of which will substan-
tially improve their sales performance of the past fiscal
year. The last two are the entrepreneurial ventures.
Presentation of Results
First Subsidiary Question
Are there differences in the generation of private
source investment capital and debt financing?
The answer to this question is of fundamental interest
to this study because it focuses simultaneously on venture









Year of Venture Operation
Fig. 6. Venture Sales Trend
(semi-log display)
(1971 dollars)




The general measure used is leverage. However, the
specific measure takes four forms. The first of these is
the more usual one of Total Debt divided by Total Assets.
The second specific measure is Total Debt divided'
by CDC Investment in the venture. It is closely related to
the Debt/Worth ratio because the CDC generally provides the
only capital investment in a community resource rationaliza-
tion venture. The entrepreneur provides capital in addition
to the CDC investment. This calculation represents a rela-
tionship between government investment, a particular form of
equity, and the demonstrated ability of the venture to
attract or successfully seek debt financing. Differences
in the Debt/CDC Investment ratio then may indicate a
different financial strategy or varying ability to attract
debt financing.
The third measure is a variation of the second in that
it relates total government funds received to debt financing.
In addition to the CDC investment, other government funds
may be provided to the venture to defray operating or other
expenses. These funds originate outside the Special Impact
Program, but, as will be shown presently, are of substantial
Leverage may be defined as the measure of the contri-
bution of the owners as compared to debt financing. It has
risk and gain implications for both owners and creditors.
See J. Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham, Managerial Finance
,




importance to the viability of some of the firms studied.
The third measure, then, relates Total Government Funds
received by the venture to Total Debt. It more directly and
completely relates the venture's reliance on government
funding to its reliance on traditional debt financing.
The fourth measure examines the record of the ventures
in attracting and utilizing outside sources of financing.
Two specific types of negotiated debt, bank lines of credit,
and long-term debt are related to CDC Capital Investment.
These represent major sources of financing found in the
financial structure of the ventures and provides a measure




Table 13 provides the first comparison of leverage
as defined above and as used by the six ventures.
The following points apply:
1. B'CC shows the highest Debt/Asset ratio. More than
60 percent of BCC's debt is included on one loan carried by
a consortium of Roanoke-area banks with an SBA guarantee of
90 percent. Therefore, the bank exposure is only 10 percent
of the outstanding balance. The remainder is government
insured. Elimination of this factor reduces the BCC ratios




These are comparable to those of other ventures established
through community resource rationalization.
TABLE 13
LEVERAGE COMPARISON: TOTAL DEBT
DIVIDED BY TOTAL ASSETS
Pi seal Year of Ventur e Operation
1 2 3 4
Possum Trot .064 .057 .101 .041
Lawson .018 .101 .286 .293
GEMCO .162 .188 .232 .510





SOURCE: Venture Financial Statements (see appendix D
table 23, for supporting data).
2. GEMCO's fourth-year figure is well above its average
either before or after.
3. Both entrepreneurial venture ratios are generally
above those of other similar age ventures. However, OVC has
a long-term, SBA-guaranteed loan for $350,000 outstanding in
its second year of operation. Omission of this loan would
reduce the OVC ratio for its second year to .335? which is
still somewhat higher than most of the other firms and a




Table 14 provides the second comparison, relating
Total Debt to CDC Investment in the venture.
TABLE 14
LEVERAGE COMPARISON: TOTAL DEBT
DIVIDED BY CDC INVESTMENT
Fiscal Year of Venture Operation
1 2 3 4
Possum Trot .080 .057 .133 .048
Lawson .030 .480 .875 • 759
GEMCO .143 .147 .200 .602
BCC 1.324 • 755
OVC .533 3.373
Phoenix .901
SOURCE: Venture Financial Statements (see appendix D,
tables 23 and 25 for supporting data).
The following points apply:
1. The same comments as above (pages 157-58) apply to
BCC, OVC, and GEMCO ratios.
2. Substantial variation between entrepreneurial and
community resource rationalization ventures are observed.
OVC and Phoenix have used a greater proportion of outside
debt than have any of the other firms. Except for Lawson,
the other firms use relatively little outside debt. Even
in their initial years, when lack of performance history
lessens the firm's attractiveness to creditors as a risk,
both Phoenix and OVC have attracted such financing.
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5. Table 14 does not provide the complete picture.
Both entrepreneurial ventures have entrepreneur capital
invested. This lowers the Debt/Worth ratio. The indications
are that the entrepreneurial firm is able to obtain debt
financing due either to different strategies, capabilities,
or financial structure or a combination of all three
factors.
Table 15 provides the third measure, reinforcing
the indications found in table 14 (page 159) and further
emphasizing the relatively greater role of government funds
in the community resource rationalization venture.
TABLE. 15
LEVERAGE COMPARISON: TOTAL DEBT DIVIDED
BY TOTAL GOVERNMENT EUNDS RECEIVED
Pi seal Year of Venture 0p<Brat ion
1 2 5 4
Possum Trot .031 .055 .082 .029
Lawson .017 .164 .469 .426




SOURCE: Venture Financial Statements (see Appendix D,
tables 25 and 25 for supporting data.)
The inclusion of all government funding provided to
the ventures significantly increases the ratio denominator
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for the community resource rationalization ventures.
This is illustrated by the fact that the ratios for those
ventures declined relatively more than did the entrepreneurial
ventures.
Table 16 provides the final measurement of leverage,
relating bank lines of credit and long-term debt to CDC
Investment Capital. These are major types of outside funding
used by the ventures.
TABLE 16
LEVERAGE COMPARISON: AVAILABLE BANK LINES
OF CREDIT AND LONG-TERM DEBT DIVIDED BY
CDC INVESTMENT CAPITAL
Fiscal Year of Venture Capital
1 2 3 4
Possum Trot .228
Lawson .741 .385




SOURCE: Job Start Corporation and Southwest Virginia
Community Development Fund, 1975 (see appendix D, table 26
for supporting data).
As indicated earlier, two of the ventures, BCC and
OVC, have negotiated long-term, SBA-guaranteed loans arranged
through local area banks.
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Each of the ventures, except BCC, has successfully
negotiated some level of bank line of credit. However, the
entrepreneurial firms have attracted a greater total level
relative to CDC Capital Investment than have the other
ventures.
It has been demonstrated that the community resource
rationalization ventures rely more heavily on government
funding. The corollary is now apparent: the entrepreneurial
ventures attract and utilize a higher proportion of outside
financing. The consequences of these conclusions v/ill
become more apparent when the Return on Investment for the
six firms is examined in the next section.
The first subsidiary question must be answered
affirmatively: differences do exist in the generation of
private source investment capital and debt financing.
Second Subsidiary Question
Are there differences in profit-income performance
and elapsed time from inception or startup to
break-even?
Performance measurement
The measure used here is Return on Investment (ROI),
relating Net Income Before Taxes to Total Assets. Two forms
of that measure are applied.
The first measure simply calculates the ratio of
Reported Net Income Before Taxes to Total Assets.
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As in the previous section, an effort is made to
demonstrate the degree of reliance the venture places on
government funding. To that end, a second measure will
subtract the Annual Government Contribution to Operating
and Other Expenses from Reported Net Income Before Taxes.
The remainder will provide a different estimate of Net
Income Before Taxes. The new estimate in turn will be




Table 17 provides the first comparison of ROI as
defined above.
TABLE 17
RETURN ON INVESTMENT COMPARISON: REPORTED
NET INCOME DIVIDED BY TOTAL ASSETS
Pi seal Year of Venture Operation
1 2 3 4 5
Possum Trot -.374 -.184 + .040 + .017 ( + )
a
Lawson + .515 + .349 + .125 -.086 (~) a
GEMCO -.545 -.191 -.012 -.072 (-) a
BCC -.324 -.341 (-) a
ovc + .056 + .075 ( + )
a
Phoenix -.342 ( + ) a
SOURCE: Venture Financial Statements (see Appendix D,
table 23 for supporting data).
Forecast for next fiscal year.
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The following points apply:
1. Only three of the firms have experienced profitable
years—Possum Trot, Lawson, and OVC. A comparison indicates
that Lawson is perhaps the most consistently profitable.
However, a loss in the fourth year is followed by a projected
loss in the fifth. Following early unprofitability, Possum
Trot has experienced two profitable years in a row with
profitability forecast for the fifth year.
2. OVC has suffered no unprofitable years, and both
Phoenix and OVC are forecast to be profitable in the next
fiscal year of operation.
3. A clear pattern of ROI does not emerge in this
table, however.
Table 18 provides the second measure of ROI, as
defined above.
The following points now apply:
1. The government contribution to annual operating and
other expenses has now been subtracted from the Reported Net
Income Before Taxes to approximate the Net Income which
would have been realized in the absence of such government
funding.
2. Possum Trot, GEMCO, and BCC have not had a single
profitable year under the new ground rules. Lawson experi-
enced profits in its first two years of operation only.
All are projected to lose money in the next fiscal year of
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RETURN ON INVESTMENT COMPARISON: REPORTED
NET INCOME LESS ANNUAL GOVERNMENT
CONTRIBUTION TO OPERATING EXPENSES
DIVIDED BY TOTAL ASSETS
Pi seal Year of Venture Operation
1 2 3 4 5
Possum Trot -1.636 -.338 -.031 -.046 (-) a
Lawson + .014 + .115 -.041 -.215 (-) a
GEMCO - .638 -.316 -.403 -.208 (-) a
BCC - .346 -.379 (-) a
OVC + .044 +.071 ( + )
a
Phoenix - .381 (+) a
SOURCE: Venture Financial Statements (see appendix D,
tables 23 and 24 for supporting data).
Forecast for next fiscal year.
3. The past and projected performance of OVC and
Phoenix remain relatively unchanged. This is due to their
relatively less reliance on government contributions to
operating and other expenses.
4. Most of the funds provided by the government to
defray expenses are in the form of manpower training funds
and are applied against labor costs. This probably leads to




extent of creating essentially unnecessary jobs. The effect
of this probability is not quantifiable with information
available. However, its presence is acknowledged.
In summary, the entrepreneurial firm relies much
less on government funding and may still produce a profit as
demonstrated by OVC's past performance and OVC's and
Phoenix's projections for the next fiscal year.
The conclusion which can be drawn is that the
presence of the entrepreneur and entrepreneurial capital
cannot guarantee profitability, but the absence of non-
governmental financing seems to indicate unprofitability.
At the end of four years, all four community resource
rationalization ventures are still unprofitable under the
second definition used. Should government funding terminate,
venture survival would most certainly be in question.
Under the second definition presented above, only
two ventures have achieved break-even status. Therefore,
no conclusions can be drawn as to the relative time to
break even.
The second subsidiary question must receive a
qualified answer. The mere presence of an entrepreneur
will not mean profitability. However, the entrepreneur
relies less on government funding than do the other firms.
Break-even is defined as four consecutive quarters
of net profitability. Not all quarters require profits,




Greater government funding replaces other-source funding in
the community resource rationalization ventures. The absence
of government contribution to operating and other expenses
would result in negative profits for these four firms while
not affecting greatly the performance of the entrepreneurial
firms. The answer to the second subsidiary question must be
a qualified yes.
Third Subsidiary Question
Are there differences in the cost to the government
per job created?
Performance measurement
The measurement of cost. per job created raises some
definitional and procedural difficulties. Different bases
have been used in Special Impact Program studies to determine
that cost. For example, the Job Start Corporation has used
the total JSC administrative and investment expenditures as
the cost. The job total used was the highest total number
of employees for the year. This disregarded any fluctuation
in levels of employment and ignored other government
contributions to the ventures. The previously mentioned
Abt Associations evaluation of the Special Impact Program
used total cost to the government, including both SIP and
non-SIP funds. This evaluation report then used "maximum
jobs" as the denominator, referring to the total number of
1See above, pp. 88-90,

168
j'obs created over time by the venture without regard to
whether the Jobs continued to exist. Computations by JSC
produced an average cost for the combined efforts of the CDC
and not for individual ventures. The Abt Associates report
aggregated costs only by groups of CDCs, rural and urban,
and not for individual CDCs or ventures. Neither of these
procedures or definitions seem to serve adequately the needs
of the present study in assessing job-creating costs to the
government.
Three measures are offered here. The first relates
the Total Cost to the Government over the life of the venture
to the Average Number of Jobs Created over the life of the
venture. This measure suffers from fluctuation in employ-
ment levels which have been experienced by five of the six
ventures studied.
The second measure simply relates the Cumulative
Total Cost to the Government to the Average Annual Employment
Fluctuation in employment tends to distort real costs, but
if average annual employment does decline as government
investment increases or remains steady, then the efficiency
of the venture in creating permanent jobs may be questioned.
A third measure generates cost per man-year instead
of cost per job. It is computed by relating the Cumulative
Total Cost to the Government to the Cumulative Average Annual
Employment. This measure presents a truer picture of
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employment costs "borne through government investment and
subsidy.
Measures of the types described above tend simul-
taneously to overstate and understate the actual costs to
the government. Costs are overstated because, if employees
were previously unemployed, they now represent reduced drain
in terms of transfer payments and are also a probable source
of new tax revenue. Costs are understated because it is
most difficult to isolate and identify all government subsidy




Table 19 provides the cost-per-job-created comparison
under the first definition above.
TABLE 19
COST TO THE GOVERNMENT PER JOB CREATED:
TOTAL COST TO GOVERNMENT OVER LIFE OP
THE VENTURE DIVIDED BY AVERAGE NUMBER









SOURCE: Venture Financial Statements




Table 19 (page 169) seems to indicate that the entre-
preneurial firms are more efficient in producing jobs than
are the other firms. However, this is again related to the
fact that substantially greater levels of government funding
have been provided to the community resource rationalization
ventures. Another important factor, inherent differences
in capital-labor intensive characteristics, may be overridden
by the magnitude of relative differences in government
funding.
It is probable that contractual agreements leading
to additional government investment in entrepreneurial
ventures will require a similar increase in entrepreneurial
investment. Similar matching fund requirements are not
present in community resource rationalization ventures,
which will result in perpetuating any differences that now
exist.
Table 20 provides a second comparison of cost to the
government per job created.
Both the absolute costs to the government and the
trends are of interest here. Possum Trot costs declined
initially and rose sharply in its fourth year. Lawson costs
have risen steadily. Unless the government investment or
contribution to expenses increases for the two entrepreneurial
ventures, their costs will decline. Rising average costs




government subsidy, or both. In either event, the trends
which are rising are cause for concern and are indicative
of lessening efficiency in providing jobs.
TABLE 20
COST TO THE GOVERNMENT PER JOB CREATED: CUMULATIVE
TOTAL COST TO THE GOVERNMENT DIVIDED BY"
AVERAGE ANMJAL EMPLOYMENT
Fiscal Year of Venture Operation
1 2 3 4
Possum Trot $ 9,878 $ 9,327 $9,290 $14,143
Lawson 2,671 3,050 4,026 5,009




SOURCE: Venture Financial Statements (see appendix D,
tables 25 and 27 for supporting data).
Table 21 provides a third comparison, the cost to
the government for one man-year.
Again, variations are related to the differences in
levels of government funding received by the two groups of
ventures. Man-year costs generally can be expected to decline
as the venture ages unless the venture requires an influx
of funds without a corresponding increase in employment
levels. The decline in man-year costs will be greater for
the ventures with the lowest level of continuing government
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funding. Therefore, it is probable that man-year costs to
the government will be less for entrepreneurial ventures.
TABLE 21
COST TO GOVERNMENT FOR ONE MAN-YEAR: CUMULATIVE
TOTAL COST TO GOVERNMENT DIVIDED BY
CUMULATIVE AVERAGE ANNUAL EMPLOYMENT
Fiscal Year of Venture Oper at ion
1 2 3 4
Possum Trot ft 9,878 $6,139 $4,263 S3, 444
Lawson 2,671 1,785 2,431 2,364




SOURCE: Venture Financial Statements (see appendix D,
tables 25 and 27 for supporting data).
The data in these three tables (19, 20, and 21)
appear to support an affirmative answer to the third sub-
sidiary question: differences do exist in the cost to the
government per Job created. The major reservation, relating
to inherent industry differences, appears to be overcome
by the magnitude of the difference.
Fourth Subsidiary Question
Are there differences in direct community economic





Community economic benefits in this instance are
defined as total payroll, including the cost of fringe
"benefits. This is only the first step in determining the
total impact of economic activity on a community. Subsequent
efforts would include investigation of the "ripple" effect
of new business and new expenditure; that is, the multi-
plier effects which follow initial economic activity.
The measure used here is cost to the government for
one payroll dollar created. It is closely related to the
cost per job measurement presented above. The calculation
is made by relating Cumulative Total Cost to the Government




Table 22 provides the basis for comparison.
The results indicated in the table are similar to
those presented for cost per job created. As the relative
government investment and expenditure declines more
rapidly in the entrepreneurial venture, the cost to the
government per payroll dollar generated will also decline
more rapidly in those ventures.
The conclusion to the fourth subsidiary question
rests also on the continuing differences in levels of
government funding. It must be answered affirmatively:
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differences do exist in the direct economic benefits as
«.
compared to government funding received.
TABLE 22
COST TO GOVERNMENT FOR ONE PAYROLL DOLLAR: CUMULATIVE
TOTAL COST TO GOVERNMENT DIVIDED BY CUMULATIVE
ANNUAL PAYROLL
Fiscal Year of Venture Operation
1 2 3 4
Possum Trot $3.5^9 $2,147 $1,354 $0,958
Laws on 0.835 0.564 0.722 0.665




SOURCE: Venture Financial Statements (see appendix D,
tables 25 and 27 for supporting data).
The Primary Question
Are there differences in the economic performance of
rural Community Development Corporation manufacturing
ventures established through the entrepreneurial search
approach and those established under the conimunity
resource rationalization approach?
Measurement
The measures applied to the subsidiary questions
included leverage, return on investment, cost to the govern-
ment per 30b created, .cost to the government per man-year
created, and cost to the government per payroll dollar
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generated. Analyses of differences found through these
measures have been presented qualitatively without attempt
to establish precise valuations of those differences.
Conclusion
The major threads which link all of the attempts to
determine performance or strategy are the relative differ-
ences in government funding, both in capital investment and
continuing subsidy, and the related requirement of entre-
preneurial investment in entrepreneurial ventures.
The entrepreneurial ventures rely to a relatively
less extent on government funding and to a relatively
greater extent on other sources. The success of entrepreneurs
in attracting other source funds may lie partly in the fact
that they have some personal investment, superior management
capability as perceived by funding sources, or a profitable
business record, or in the conscious decision by community
resource rationalization ventures to limit outside control
and influence through limiting outside investment.
Whatever the reason, the result is extensive
reliance on government support by community resource
rationalization ventures. These ventures may now find
attracting other funding most difficult because of poor
business performance, with questionable survival in the
event of termination of government support. Funding from
other than government sources does not guarantee success
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but its absence may render venture survival most difficult
in such a situation.
Differences in ROI, cost to the government in terms
of o°fr s ? man-years, and payroll dollars created have all
been qualitatively discussed and established. All are
related to and exaggerated by the differences in government






Earlier chapters have outlined "both procedural and
philosophical variations noted in the practice of community
development. Business ventures are the primary tools of the
community development corporation through which it achieves
community economic development. Two specific approaches to
the establishment of business ventures have been identified.
Each approach rests on a different concept of community
control. Both approaches have identical overall goals: the
creation of "appreciable impact" in solving urban and rural
community problems. Specific goals include arresting
tendencies toward dependency, chronic unemployment, and
community deterioration. Of equal importance is the
legislative objective that benefits thus achieved should be
permanent and should survive the termination of government
financial support. Finally, the stated policy of the OED
is that ventures should maximize profits in the short term.
By implication, the institution-building functions of the





The final chapter briefly summarizes the objectives
of the research, restates the research question, and presents
conclusions relative to the research questions and achieve-
ment of the objectives. This is followed by a brief
discussion of the value and usefulness of the research
results and suggestions for further study.
Objectives
The basic objectives of the research were to
determine whether performance differences exist between
CDC ventures established through entrepreneurial search
and community resource rationalization, to identify the
differences, and to determine whether they affect the
future viability of the venture and its potential for
delivering permanent benefits to the community. The
objectives include the assignment of an ordinal valuation
to the differences and not the determination of interval
or ratio valuation. The investigation was limited in two
ways. First, it was limited to rural CDCs and, second,
to manufacturing ventures of those rural CDCs. The
latter limitation reflects the fact that the highest
priority need of rural areas as perceived by rural resi-
dents is Jobs. The second limitation also reflects the
fact that the preponderance of rural CDC ventures is




To achieve the objectives of the study, the following
research question was formulated:
Are there differences in the economic performance of
rural Community Development Corporation manufacturing
ventures established through the entrepreneurial search
approach and those established under the community
resource rationalization approach?
Conclusions
The research in support of the answer to the primary
question was organized around four subsidiary questions
designed to identify differences in performance of six
firms established under the two approaches.
A basic difference was found in that less reliance
was placed on the government as a source of funding by
the entrepreneurial firms, both for capital investment
and operating expenses. The firms established through
community resource rationalization were either unable or
did not desire to leverage government funds to any great
extent. A reason for not desiring to rely on outside
sources of funding could have been the reluctance to
dilute community control over such ventures, a situation
which might arise through conditions accompanying such
financing.
A second difference was found in return on investment
The community resource rationalization firms were found to
rely on government funding to defray operating expenses
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to a larger extent. This factor contributed. to the Net
Profit Before Taxes in the amount of the government subsidy.
When the government contribution to operating expenses was
deducted from the Net Income Before Taxes, the resultant
showed negative profit for the community resource rationali-
zation firms. Little effect was noted in the profit
position of the entrepreneurial search firms because of
less reliance on government funding.
A third difference related to the efficiency of the
firm in creating jobs. The entrepreneurial search ventures
were found to create jobs at a lower cost to the government,
again because of less dependence on government funding.
Similar results were found in the relative cost to
the government per dollar of payroll generated. The
reason is also related to the greater reliance placed on
government funding by community resource rationalization
ventures.
The overall results indicate that differences exist
between the two sets of firms; that without continued
government funding, the community resource rationalization
ventures in the study would find survival difficult; that
results place the contribution of community resource
rationalization ventures to permanent community benefits
in doubt, at least in the event of the termination of govern-
ment contribution to their expenses; that entrepreneurial
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search ventures have developed other than government funding
sources including, and perhaps based upon, the personal
investment of the entrepreneur; and that the entrepreneurial
search venture shows substantially better viability potential
in the event of government funding termination. Therefore,
it appears that support of entrepreneurial search should be
continued and perhaps even expanded, but not terminated.
Value of the Study
The study is considered of value in at least two
areas. As indicated earlier, OED has tentatively decided
to reduce funding in support of the INED entrepreneurial
search efforts on behalf of CDCs. The reduction will be
by one-half in fiscal year 1976, and funding support will
be eliminated completely in fiscal year 1977* If CDCs
elect to use the IKED services, the CDC must pay for them.
This is ostensibly based on the OED desire to leave policy
and operating decisions at the CDC or local level.
It seems reasonable to assume that the CDC will
respond more directly to local pressures and objectives
in the absence of OED's financial and policy support of
entrepreneurial search programs. The result may well be
that the approach will not be used except by those CDCs
which have had positive experiences with it in the past.
At the least, use of the approach will be slower to spread
to other CDCs. The CDCs will continue to emphasize local
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control of developmental efforts and may not take advantage
of an excellent approach to venture establishment.
The results of the study may provide the OED with
a basis for reconsideration of the entrepreneurial search
funding decision. Alternatively, publication to the CDCs,
the Center for Community Economic Development, and the
National Congress for Community Economic Development may
persuade CDCs of the merits of the entrepreneurial approach
to venture establishment.
The second area to which the study contributes is
that of the community development theoretical framework.
It has been demonstrated that superior economic performance
can be obtained through the use of entrepreneurial search
and entrepreneurial ventures. This has been accompanied
by some dilution of local control. But the control
relinquished has been over the management and operation of
the venture and not over its goals, objectives, and commit-
ment to the community. The interests of the local community
can be protected through a carefully formulated contractual
agreement between the entrepreneur and the CDC. All of the
benefits of economic development which accompany venture
establishment and operation can be accrued without coping
with operational problems which require the services of
well-qualified personnel and divert the CDC staff from its
primary role of community institution building. The
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ability to maintain local control over economic development,
improve economic performance, and still accept a minority
position in the venture is important to the theory of
community economic development.
Suggested Additional Research
Development of Measurement Criteria
Perhaps the most obvious need in the area of community
development is agreement on what to measure and how to
measure it. Economic performance and progress can be
measured through the use of fairly well-accepted criteria
and procedures. However, there is disagreement on whether
economic factors are important to measure in a poverty
program. Progress toward social or political goals is much
more complex and difficult to measure. A costly, major
study of the Special Impact Program has been severely
criticized because of the inability to gain prior agreement
on the basic definitions, goals of the program, and indi-
cators of progress toward the goals. Regarding the Special
Impact Program specifically, there is little agreement on
a definition of "appreciable impact" and what it means in
reducing unemployment, community deterioration, and tendencies
toward chronic dependency. There is little agreement on
what "maximum feasible local participation" and "local




But there is resistance to studies which try to evaluate
or define these elusive concepts. A continuation of the
present inability to evaluate the Special Impact Program or
to define its goals and develop measurement standards could
result at best in externally imposed definitions, measure-
ment criteria, and evaluations or, at worst, in termination
of the program by an exasperated political body.
Costs and Benefits of Government
Investment
Both of the CDC executive directors indicated their
unwillingness to continue the operation of an unprofitable
venture except possibly in the short term. The reasons
given included the resulting inability to attract outside
funding for a venture with a poor profit performance record
and the undesirability of creating the impression that the
venture was just another government-subsidized program.
It would appear that an excellent case could be put
forth for continuing to operate ventures at a loss over an
extended period of time. Such a decision would have to be
based on a conclusion that the costs of maintaining a
subsidized business with a given level of employment are
less than maintaining a similar number of community persons
through transfer payments. The approach to such a study
would presumably use cost-benefit techniques to identify
all the elements of the program. Net government outlays,
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training "benefits, increased value of fixed assets, and
individual and community pride are among the many factors
to be considered.
Approval of this concept of subsidization of
ventures would require a long-range commitment of government
funding, which may be beyond the ability of Congress to
ensure. However, it is possible that the net benefits of
the program would outweigh the net costs.
OED-CDC Relationships
The question of CDC autonomy in its relationship
with OED is one that goes beyond the normal friction induced
by bureaucratic procedures and tendencies. There is little
question that OED must retain some control over the CDC
and its expenditure of government funds. But there is also
little question that the CDC needs a certain degree of
autonomy in its operations.
Perhaps the most frustrating part of the venture
history as it has been researched for this study is in
regard to the establishment of new ventures. In specific
instances, venture startup has been delayed to the point
where one venture missed seasonal markets almost completely
and a second would have missed a seasonal market had startup




The OED policy strongly discourages expansion of
CDCs outside the impact area. The reasons for this,
relating to local control and local impact, are generally
sound. However, where the proposal concerns a normal
expansion of impact area venture activity, then the case
against such expansion is not so compelling. The tendency
is to treat all decisions regarding CDCs within a common
set of gradations. It seems important that this normal
tendency of the bureaucracy be overcome.
A study of OED-CDC relationships might set up
classes of CDCs by age, size, demonstrated performance, and
management quality or capability with the purpose of allowing
autonomy to increase as the CDC negotiates certain mutually
agreed stages of development or demonstrates certain
capabilities.
A related study might inquire into the relative
emphasis placed on social, political, and economic goals
within OED. During the present research, much internal
conflict over the priority of goals was found within the
agency, detracting substantially from the business acumen
or economic emphasis represented. Perhaps a reexamination
of the Bureau of the Budget study is needed. The study
concluded that the social orientation of 0E0 personnel
should prevail over their business orientation. A
recasting of the study in the light of present OED policy




An area related to the methodology of the present
study but not specifically to the Special Impact Program
concerns the availability of performance data of firms in
various lines of activity. Highly aggregated data are
compiled by Dun and Bradstreet and by Robert Morris
Associates, as well as by trade associations. All of the
trade associations representing the lines of activity of
the six firms in the present study were contacted for data
relating to the first five years' operations of new firms.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Small Business Administration, and the
Department of Commerce were also contacted in an effort
to locate such data. All sources responded that available
information was not aggregated in such a manner that data
on firms by age could be extracted. The data have little
applicability to feasibility studies for new businesses
unless they represent the experience of the first few years
of activity.
The development of procedures to extract such data
should be of great interest to the Small Business Administra-
tion, OED, and venture capitalists.
Infrastructure Development
A final suggested study would examine the extent to
which anti-poverty agencies, including the'OEO, the Economic

188
Development Administration, and others, contribute to the
creation of a positive business environment. Of particular
interest are the development of manpower, labor skills,
transportation, industrial sites, and other elements of the
community infrastructure. These elements are of critical
importance to the success of community resource rationali-
zation. Their presence or absence contributes directly to
the attractiveness of outside investment, which is essential
to the long-range development potential of the community.
Concluding Comment
Efforts to evaluate the Special Impact Program, as
represented by the present study, are important to the
continuation of the program. Of paramount importance are
the definition of program goals and agreement on how
achievement is to be measured. This is not too much to




POLICY STATEMENT ON SPECIAL IMPACT PROGRAM
SOURCE: U.S., Office of Economic Development,
Washington, D.C., October 22, 1974-
.

OFFICE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Policy Statement on Special Impact Program
I. INTRODUCTION
The Special Impact Program is a national program, with
certain specified goals and objectives established by statute
and with certain criteria against which program performance
is to be measured. While the legislation does not specify a
rigid program model, the Special Impact Program is essentially
a demonstration program, in that it provides for "special
programs of assistance" to specific kinds of organizations
(i.e., CDCs and related cooperatives), subject to the limita-
tion of their being of "sufficient size, scope and duration
to have an appreciable impact," thereby clearly limiting their
number. Unlike the Community Action Program, where some 950
agencies are funded nationwide to undertake an almost unlimited
range of anti-poverty projects, determined by' "local initiative,"
the Special Impact Program focuses only on a limited number of
organizations and on the community economic development approach
to the elimination of poverty.
Continued designation of the Special Impact Program
as a demonstration program will not prevent vigorous pursuit
of additional resources to enlarge and strengthen its impact
throughout the country. It will, instead, ensure greater
flexibility in the structure and goals of each CDC; allow
expansion of the program at a rational pace; reduce public
expectation of immediate solutions to long-standing problems;
and result in strengthening the concept of community economic
development as a mechanism for providing access to economic
and social opportunities and advantages.
Given the demonstration aspect of the Special Impact
Program, it is essential that the Office of Economic Develop-
ment provide policy direction to the CDC beyond the technical
responsibility of any grant-making Federal agency to insure
that funds are properly and legally administered. This
direction shall consist primarily of establishing overall
program objectives and evaluation criteria, and of determining
relative priorities among such objectives. In exercising
its policy direction responsibilities, however, OED will




policy development process and to review and comment upon
OED proposed policies prior to their being promulgated in
final form.
While the Title VTI legislation mandates a policy
direction role for OED, it also mandates that economic
development be pursued through community based corporations,
responsive to the residents of the impact area served, which
furthers the efforts of the poor to participate more effec-
tively in community life, both social and economic.
Accordingly, within the broad policy parameters set down
by OED in compliance with the legislation, each CDC must
be accorded maximum possible autonomy. This means that,
consistent with OED policies and priorities, the CDC shall
be free to develop a local strategy suited to local needs
and conditions for community economic development, including
the freedom to request exceptions to OED policies where the
CDC can demonstrate that such policies conflict with the
particular needs of the impact area. This also means that,
subject to the agreements negotiated with OED during the
funding (or refunding) process, as represented by the approved
budget and work program, the CDC shall be free to manage its
program over the course of the grant period without interfer-
ence in its day-to-day operations and without changes in the
operating ground rules or conditions governing the grant,
unless agreed to by the CDC. Finally, this means that, to
the extent permitted by statutory limitations, grant conditions,
and OED procedures regulating the release of venture capital
funds, the CDC shall be free to control the resources committed
to it, including the re-allocation of resources as needed to
meet changing conditions and program requirements.
II. PROGRAM POLICIES AND PRIORITIES
A. Appreciable Impact . Special impact areas face severe
shortages of income, jobs, skilled human resources and,
perhaps more important, viable institutions responsive to
the needs of impact area residents and capable of meeting the
staggering challenges posed by impact area problems.
The ultimate goal of the Special Impact Program is, of
course, to achieve parity between the impact areas and the
areas surrounding them, to correct the tremendous imbalance
in institutional capacity, income, jobs and human resources.
It is clear, however, that this kind of parity cannot be
attained in anything like the short term, by the Special
Impact Program or by any other community economic development




Moreover, the legislative objective of- "appreciable
impact" should not be equated with this ultima'te goal.
Appreciable impact, in statutory terms, is to be directed
toward "arresting tendencies toward dependency, chronic
unemployment and community deterioration" (emphasis added).
In other words, appreciable impact will occur not when parity
has been achieved—that is, not when the ultimate goal of
eliminating poverty is attained—but when current economic,
social and institutional trends have been reversed—at that
point when the continued downward spiral of deterioration has
been halted and the long, upward climb begun.
Appreciable impact will thus be measured by a variety
of indicators with respect to characteristic "tendencies"
that have been "arrested"; by a net inflow, rather than out-
flow, of jobs and income into the impact area; by the
establishment of profitable ventures and property developments
which will attract private capital into the impact area; by
the increase in skilled managers and workers in the impact
area; and by reductions in unemployment and public assistance
rolls.
These indicators should not normally be expected to
occur simultaneously, since some are essentially precondi-
tions to others. Thus, a stable, viable CDC itself, measured
by the presence of active, representative boards, competent,
responsive staff, and broad-based support in and ties to the
impact area, is an initial indicator that progress toward
appreciable impact is being made.
Secondly, successful venture and property developments
which give the CDC and its efforts visibility and credibility
are subsequent indicators. This should be followed by
increases in private capital investment, based on the CDC's
own initial successes. Only when these indicators are present
should measurable impacts on employment, income, and public
assistance dependency of the program's primary beneficiaries
be anticipated.
B. Self-Sufficiency. Title VII requires that CDC pro-
grams- continue to have appreciable impact after the termination
of Title VII assistance. This is, of course, inherent in the
definition of appreciable impact; since if an impact is appreci-
able only when it reverses economic and social deterioration
it must also be permanent and self-perpetuating.
This leads to the question of whether a CDC must thus




an appreciable and continuing impact. To answer this question,
a distinction must first be made between self-sufficiency of
individual CDC ventures and self-sufficiency of the CDC itself .
A venture is self-sufficient when it can generate sufficient
income without further subsidy to cover its costs (i.e., break
even) or clear a profit (i.e., permit reinvestment for further
expansion). On the other hand, while individual ventures may
be self-sufficient, they may not be generating sufficient
profits to finance the administrative costs of catalytic
institutions, such as the CDC itself, or social programs
operated or sponsored by the CDC. In this sense, the CDC is
not self-sufficient even though its ventures may be. Were
subsidization of the CDC administrative or non-venture program
costs to terminate, the CDC as an institution would also termi-
nate or have to cut back on its operations, even though
individual ventures could continue to operate successfully and
be self-sustaining.
However, the failure of a CDC to attain self-sufficiency
does not preclude the attainment of an appreciable and con-
tinuing impact after termination of Title VII funding. It is
quite possible that, while all ventures may not together be
generating sufficient profits to cover all CDC costs, the CDC
may still have effected permanent change in the impact area
and such change may still continue in the absence of the CDC.
Appreciable impact and self-sufficiency are not, therefore
synonymous; one can occur without the other.
Business ventures (that is, ventures where either
maximum or optimal profits are the objective, as opposed
to social ventures; see Section D below) can and should be
expected to attain self-sufficiency over the short term.
While some refinancing will be required over the next few
years for CDC business ventures, since refinancing is
generally required by any growing business, it is expected
that after this period CDC business ventures will have passed
the break-even point and profits will be adequate to meet
most growth needs. While self-sufficiency of business
ventures is therefore a short term objective of the Special
Impact Program, it is neither possible nor particularly
desirable for CDCs themselves to attain self-sufficiency
over the short term.
To begin with, it is highly unrealistic to expect even
self-sustaining business ventures to generate sufficient
profits to cover CDC administrative and non-venture program
costs in the foreseeable future. Even if the scale of venture
investment were markedly increased, it is unlikely that this




even if the ventures were operating in conditions more
favorable than those which prevail in the impact areas.
But more important, just as appreciable impact can
occur without the CDC first becoming self-sustaining, so can
CDC self-sufficiency be achieved without appreciable impact.
In fact, a misplaced emphasis on CDC self-sufficiency may
postpone, if not defeat, the objective of achieving appreci-
able impact. Reduction of CDC administrative costs or
retraction of CDC non-venture social program efforts may be
the necessary price for achieving self-sufficiency at a stage
where such reductions in efforts may be highly undesirable.
Similarly, premature use of venture profits to underwrite
CDC administrative costs rather than for reinvestment for
further venture expansion may seriously slow the forward
momentum of the CDCs ' economic development program.
Moreover, since the objectives of the Special Impact
Program are not solely economic, CDCs must also be able to
invest in social programs which will require a continuing
subsidy, at least over the short term, and possibly indefi-
nitely. The source of the subsidy need not and should not,
however, be solely Title VII funds. In this regard, the
CDCs should seek, with OED assistance, financial support
from other Federal agencies, from state and local government,
and from private sources.
While ultimately it is anticipated that CDC self-
sufficiency will become possible through a combination of
venture profits and non-Title VII subsidization, it is in
the long-run interests of the Special Impact Program to
continue OED support of the CDC s administrative and non-
venture program costs for as long as possible so as to
maximize the continuing catalytic institutional effects
produced by CDC activity and so as "co promote the earliest
possible attainment of appreciable impact.
The goal of CDC self-sufficiency must be considered
a long-range goal if it is an appropriate goal at all.
Certainly much more Federal money will need to be received
for strengthening and expanding the program before "appreci-
able impact" can be reached. Consideration should be given
to the possibility that the CDC program is a proper subject
for continued Federal subsidization, along with other






C. Institution-Building . One of the fundamental differ-
ences between impact areas and the surrounding communities is
the lack in the impact areas of viable, responsive institutions
capable of addressing the variety of economic and social
problems facing impact area residents. Coupled with the
institutional poverty within the impact area is the total
unresponsiveness of outside institutions. Thus, one of the
primary objectives of the Special Impact Program is the
creation of new institutions and a change in the attitude and
behavior of existing institutions.
A wide range of institutions are needed, including
planning and coordinating institutions, capital-providing and
debt-providing institutions, employment-generating and wage-
increasing institutions. The key institution in this
institution-building thrust is, of course, the CDC itself.
The CDC not only directly plays all these roles (planning,
capital-providing, etc.) but is the central catalytic force
that in turn creates, or promotes increased responsiveness
of, other institutions which perform one or more of these
crucial functions.
The CDC ' s institution-building role is the primary
experimental feature of the Special Impact Program. The CDC
is a community-based, representative planning institution
which must undertake even more coordinated planning of impact
area economic activity in the future. Until now, it has been
the major source of equity and debt capital in the impact
areas, and will continue to be in the short term, although
its role in the long term should shift to stimulation of
capital and debt provision from other institutions, primarily
from sources outside the impact area. It has, directly or
through its ventures, been a source of employment, but over
the short term it cannot be anticipated to make a significant
impact on employment. Finally, the CDC has also been a
subsidization institution, in that it has made official
guarantee programs relevant and available to the impact
areas.
The institution-building objective of the Special
Impact Program is, and will remain, the top priority. It is
the area where CDCs have already made the greatest impacts
and where in the short term OED expects the greatest degree
of achievement. Since institution-building is a pre-condition
for all other objectives of the Special Impact Program, CDC





D. Venture Profitability . There are four basic categories
of CDC ventures: (1) true business ventures organized for
profit, including wholly owned CDC ventures and ventures in
which the CDC has either a majority or minority equity position:
(2) loan funds, loan guarantee funds, and consumer credit
unions, where little or no profit is intended, but where loan
funds may be used by individual recipients for profit-connected
business purposes; (3) infrastructure development, including
those overhead investments such as water and sewer systems,
roads, land improvements, etc. , which are not themselves
profitable but which are essential preconditions for the
development of other profitable ventures; and (4-) social
"ventures," which are not ventures at all, but rather service
programs and other community development activities, such as
day care centers, manpower training, health services, etc.
,
which are supportive of the CDC's overall community economic
development efforts.
Business ventures, which are profit-making in purpose,
loan funds, which are essentially break-even activities, and
infrastructure development which can usually only at best be
profitable in the long run are all budgeted under the Invest-
ment Capital cost category. Social ventures, which will
generally be expected to require a continued subsidy, whether
from Title VII or other sources, are budgeted under the other
cost categories, as appropriate, along with other CDC
administrative costs.
True business ventures fall, in turn, into two sub-
categories: ventures whose objective is to maximize profits;
and ventures whose objective is to optimize profits, given
simultaneous social objectives whose pursuit requires the
trade-off of some profits. Where optimization of profits,
rather than maximization is the objective of a business
venture, the CDC must so indicate, prior to investment of the
venture funds, in its funding application and venture plans,
and OED must specifically approve such an approach. In
identifying optimization objectives, the CDC must specify
the social benefits for which profits are being traded off
and must specify the degree to which optimization is expected
to reduce profits below what they would have been if profit
maximization had been opted for.
Although it is appropriate for a given CDC to have a
mix of venture types, the priority over the short term should
be on business ventures. Moreover, among business ventures,
the priority over the short term should be on profit





It is not a logical necessity that maximizing profits
will ensure institutionalization of the CDC program. One of
the most attractive aspects of the program, as far as the
private sector is concerned, is that CDCs attempt to make a
profit while serving larger social goals. Therefore, optimi-
zation should be the goal over the long term.
Whether ventures are for maximum or optimum profits,
for no profits, or for non-business purposes requiring a
continued subsidy, the specific objectives must be spelled
out prior to venture approval, and will constitute the criteria
against which venture performance will be measured. Where a
venture includes both business and social objectives, per-
formance will be measured against both sets of objectives.
Qualified management for business ventures, of course, is
essential.
E. Employment . While the employment of low-income and
unemployed impact area residents and increased income for
impact area residents are among the most important long-range
objectives of the Special Impact Program, it is not antici-
pated that any CDC can make a significant impact over the
short term in this area. Moreover, undue emphasis however
well-intentioned, on employment in the early stages of a
CDCs efforts can have a detrimental impact on its initial
success with business ventures and hence its ultimate
success.
All things being equal, ventures with a greater employ-
ment potential should be given higher priority than those with
smaller employment potential, but in the short term job
creation should not be pursued as an objective at the sacrifice
of venture profits (unless, as noted in Section D above, the
costs can be subsidized by non-Title VII funds). The CDCs
long-term employment objectives can be better served by
concentrating in the short term on increasing venture profits
so as to solidify the CDCs institutional standing and so as
to attract outside capital for new ventures or venture
expansion, than by emphasizing jobs at the risk of producing
marginal ventures and an image of failure for the CDC. Even
with a heavy emphasis on jobs, a CDC at best can have only a
marginal impact on impact area unemployment during the early
years of its program. Substantial inroads on unemployment
cannot be expected until after a solid base of CDC and joint
CDC/private ventures has been laid.
CDC performance in the employment area cannot be effec-




Program. Rather than a linear expansion of employment in
roughly equal increments over time, fairly negligible
increases should be anticipated over the course of the first
three or four years, followed by substantial spurts in subse-
quent years. Not until heavy expansion and reinvestment of
profits from early ventures will dividends, in the form of
reduced unemployment and increased personal income, be paid.
There shall be renewed commitment on the part of OED
to facilitate increased manpower training for non-managerial
positions in the venture programs. This might be directly
by OED, or OED will play a leadership role in seeking assis-
tance from appropriate Federal agencies (such as DOL, USDA,
BIA, Commerce, etc.) to provide specialized training when
such assistance is necessary for the success of a venture.
F. Human Development . While human development objectives
are essential to increased incomes and improved quality of
life, misplaced emphasis at the early stages of a CDC's efforts
may, in the absence of specific subsidies for that purpose,
detract from venture performance and threaten the institution-
building priorities of the CDC. Investment in training of
venture managers, rather than the recruitment of expert
managers, has been a major cause of CDC venture loss to date.
Human development within the CDC itself, as opposed to
its business ventures, is, however, a high priority over the
short term. In this instance, human development is essential
to the central objective of institution-building, in that it
is often the only way to ensure that the development effort
will be directed from within the impact area by a planning
institution—the CDC—responsive to the community. The
development of skills of CDC managers, as opposed to venture
managers, is, therefore, fully consistent with OED priorities,
over the short run, where fully expert managers for the CDC
are not available in the impact area.
G. Beneficiaries . The primary beneficiaries of the
Special Impact Program are the low-income residents of the
impact area. The overall long-range objectives of the program
are therefore directed toward improving the employment,
incomes, environment, living conditions, and participation
in community life of these residents. In order to produce
benefits for low-income impact area residents, however, the
institution-building and venture development efforts of the
CDC require the participation of the non-poor in managerial





ventures provide employment and human development opportuni-
ties for other residents, and, perforce, non-residents, these
individuals also become "beneficiaries" of the program.
Nevertheless, such "beneficiaries" are primarily means toward
the ends of the program, who must be present for ultimate
program success, but who in themselves do not constitute a
final measure of success. Generally, the 0E0 poverty guidelines
will be used as a basis for determining whether a resident is
low-income although each CDC is free, subject to OED approval,
to employ other guidelines where it can demonstrate that local
circumstances justify a modified standard.
The boundaries of the impact areas should be subject to
change as social and economic conditions of the community
dictate. The boundaries should be explicitly defined at the
beginning of each grant period. All monies of a particular
grant period should be used within the defined impact area
except when specifically approved by OED upon demonstration
by the CDC that investment outside the impact area would
produce direct and substantial benefits to the residents of
the area.
Where a CDC or its ventures provide non-managerial or
non-professional employment opportunities, such opportunities
should be restricted to residents of the impact area.
Similarly, all social service and other non-venture benefits
of a CDC should be restricted insofar as feasible to impact
area residents. Preference for all such employment and
services should go to low-income rather than middle-income
residents.
Wherever possible, managerial and professional positions
in the CDC and its ventures should be filled by residents of
the impact area; and when non-residents are recruited, they
should be encouraged to relocate to the impact area. In the
case of venture managers, however, experience and training
are crucial. Accordingly, unqualified residents should never
be hired for these positions instead of qualified and experi-
enced non-residents. In most cases, the CDC will have to
recruit from outside the impact area to find proper managers
for its ventures. In the case of the CDC itself, ties to
the community are more relevant to the success of the program.
Accordingly, it may be more appropriate when recruiting CDC
managers to compromise on the specific qualifications
—
provided,
of course, deficiencies can be corrected by on-the-job
training—in order to hire residents who understand and have
credibility in the impact area. Even in recruiting CDC





the community to find individuals with the necessary skills








JSC GROWTH AID DEVELOPMENT

JSC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT
For purposes of tracing the evolution of JSC
activity, figures 7? 8, and 9 are provided. Figure 7 indi-
cates the level of activity at the time of JSC incorporation,
Sources of other than 0E0 assistance are arrayed along the
right side. All but the Edna Clark Foundation grant of
$50,000 and the entrepreneurial investment are either
government or "bank resources.
Figures 8 and 9 summarize organizational changes
and growth in JSC enterprises. Other enterprises include
the following:
Hill Country Hickory House Restaurant . This enter-
prise is operated "by the Knox County Community Development
Corporation (KCCDC). JSC has provided $60,900 in grants
to the KCCDC for its development and operation.
Arts and Crafts Store . Operated as an adjunct to
the restaurant by KCCDC, this store provides a sales outlet
for craft products fabricated by local community residents.
No investment is recorded by JSC.
Frakes Feeder Cooperative . This enterprise has
provided an opportunity for pig farmers to realize lower






Fig. 7. Anti-Poverty Organizations in JSC Impact Area
October 1969
Key:
CAP — Community Action Program Funding
CDC — Community Development Corporation





East Lake-Cumberland (Wayne, Clinton, McCreary Counties)
Knox County Economic Opportunity Council (KCEOC)







































Fig. 8. JSC, December 1972
Key:
JSC has minority position
.... Elects JSC Board Members
KCCDC affiliated with JSC
All Performance Figures FY 1972
^Y ends March 31.













































Fig. 9. JSC, March 1975
FY ends July 31.
}
FY ends October 31.
'FY ends March 31.
1
FY ends December 31
•
Key:
.... Elects Board Members




GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF SVCDF

GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT OF SVCDF
For purposes of summarizing the growth in SVCDF
activity, figures 10, 11, and 12 are provided. Figure 10
indicates the anti-poverty organizations in Roanoke at the
time of initial SVCDF funding. Sources of other than 0E0
assistance to SVCDF are arrayed along the right side. All
but the Edna Clark Foundation, which provided a grant of
$66,000, are either government or local resources.
Figure 11 indicates the establishment of GEMCO and
BCC, in addition to the following activities:
Irongate Water and Development Corporation . Fifteen
families in rural Botetourt County formed an association to
expand a water system from a neighboring county into their
area. SVCDF provided a $40,000, low-interest, forty-year
loan.
Impact Housing Corporation . A for-profit housing
venture, this corporation built twelve low-income units in
Craig County. The houses were sold under the Farmers Home
Loan Administration Credit Program. SVCDF invested $82,500,
with private banks investing $81,400.
Minority Loan programs . These represent a



























Southwest Virginia Community Development Fund
Department of Labor
Opportunity Industrialization Center
Total Action Against Poverty
(The Roanoke Community Action Agency)





























Fig. 11. SVCDF, December 1972




businessmen in loan packaging, involving SBA and local
banks, but without SVCDF investment.
The present activity is as shown in figure 12. All
three general membership organizations are now incorporated.
Craig Furniture Corporation . This is the first
manufacturing activity established in the third part of the
impact area. The SVCDF has invested $385,000 and local banks
$350,000 under SBA guarantee of 90 percent. Projected first-
year employment is thirty, with $400,000 in sales.
Cherry Hill Manor . Low income apartment complex of
fifteen units in Northwest Roanoke, financed by a local bank,
insured and subsidized by the Federal Housing- Administration.
The SVCDF has invested $11,500.
Craig Medical Clini c. Built by the Craig Improve-
ment Association with a $35,000 long-term loan from SVCDF.
Efforts to recruit a medical doctor for the clinic have so
far proved unsuccessful.
Botetourt Cannery . Built by the Botetourt Community
Association with a $17,000, ten-year loan from SVCDF, the
cannery provides assistance and facilities to residents who













































Fig. 12. SVCDF, December 197^
FY ends July 31.







VENTURE NET SALES, TOTAL ASSETS, TOTAL DEBT, AND
REPORTED NET INCOME BEFORE TAX BY FISCAL YEAR



































































































10/31/74 155.1 217.4 94.6 (74.4)
(See Notes to Table 23, page 214.)
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Notes to Table 23
Definitions
Net Sales
Gross sales less discounts and returns.
Total Assets
Total of current and fixed assets less depreciation.
Total Debt
Total of current and long-term liabilities.
Reported Net Income Before Taxes
All expenses have been deducted except tax payments
or provision for tax payments.
Data Sources
SVCDF Ventures
All data were extracted from audited financial
statements.
JSC Ventures
Phoenix and OVC data were extracted from audited
financial statements.
Possum Trot data were extracted from audited finan-
cial statements except for the six-month period ending
June 30, 1973 and the twelve-month period ending March 31?
1975. Unaudited statements were used for these periods.
Adjustments were required to reflect a 197^- change to a
fiscal year ending March 31 instead of December 31.
Lawson Furniture data are based on audits conducted
June 30, 1971 and June 30, 197^? and on unaudited statements,
quarterly reports submitted to OED, and other similar sources
for periods not covered by audits.
Lawson Furniture represents the major business
activity of the Knox County CDC and financial data of the
two entities are combined. For purposes of financial




GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS TO OPERATING EXPENSES
BY FISCAL YEAR































































































10/51/74 4.0 4.5 • • 8.5
NA - not available.
(See Notes to Table 24, page 216.)

216





Other government subsidies are largely Department of
Labor Manpower Training grants which are used to defray labor
costs. Lawson Furniture also receives grants from 0E0
programs other than the SIP. The non-SIP funds are channeled
directly through the Knox County CDC to Lawson Furniture and
are used to defray all types of expenses. Detailed utiliza-
tion of funds thus received is not available.
CDC Technical Assistance
The CDC staff provides technical assistance to the
venture in legal, financial, production, marketing, and other
problem areas as needed.
CDC-Funded Consultant Support
The supporting CDC occasionally funds the assistance
of outside consulting firms provided to the ventures.
Data Sources
SVCDF Ventures
The amounts of Other Government Subsidy were taken
from the audited financial statements. The amounts of CDC
Technical Assistance and CDC-Funded Consultant Support were
provided by the Director of Business Planning and Research.
JSC Ventures
The amounts of Other Government Subsidy were taken
from audited or unaudited financial statements as available.
CDC Technical Assistance documentation was available
in a combination of man-hours and funds expended. Where only
man-hours expended were available, a valuation of $8 per hour
was used through fiscal year 1974, and $10 per hour was used
thereafter.
The amounts of CDC-Funded Consultant Support were
taken directly from CDC financial statements.
Other
INED entrepreneurial search expenditures for Phoenix
and OVC were defrayed by a grant from 0E0. These expenditures
are not included in the government subsidy or investment
figures because similar venture establishment costs cannot be





OUTSIDE AND CDC CAPITAL INVESTMENT, TOTAL GOVERNMENT
CONTRIBUTION TO OPERATING EXPENSES, AND
TOTAL GOVERNMENT FUNDS RECEIVED
BY VENTURE AND FISCAL YEAR


































































































10/51/74 92.0 105.0 8.5 115.5
(See Notes to Table 25, page 218.)
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Notes to Table 25
Definitions
Outside Capital Investment
Capital provided from sources other than the support-
ing CDC. Phoenix and the Outdoor Venture Corporation have
capital invested by their entrepreneurs.
CDC Capital Investment
Capital invested in the ventures by the supporting
CDC, the Job Start Corporation, and the Southwest Virginia
Community Development Fund. A large proportion of these
investments are in the form of subordinated, convertible
debentures. However, the clear intention of such debentures
is not debt but equity investment and is so reflected in the
data. The intent of equity investment is confirmed by the





Total Government Contribution to Operating Expenses
plus the CDC Capital Investment.
Data Sources
The Outside Capital Investment and CDC Capital





CDC CAPITAL INVESTMENT, LINE OE CREDIT, AND
LONG-TERM DEBT BY VENTURE AND FISCAL YEAR
































































































10/51/74 105.0 117-0 • • 117.0
(See Notes to Table 26, page 220.)
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Notes to Table 26
Definitions
CDC Capital
CDC capital investment in ventures, including
convertible debentures.
Line of Credit
As negotiated by the venture and its supporting
banks.
Long-Term Financing
Includes debts incurred for periods of one year or
longer. OVC and BCC have both incurred long-term debt of
major proportions. Both loans carry a 90 percent SBA
guarantee. The loan granted to BCC was originally for
$280,000, and the loan to OVC was for $350,000.
Data Sources
SVCDF Ventures
Data were provided by the deputy director from CDC
records.
JSC Ventures





AVERAGE ANNUAL EMPLOYMENT AND ANNUAL PAYROLL
BY VENTURE AND FISCAL YEAR
AnnualVenture Averagea«v,-.,,,i— Annual p 1 ,
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Current dollars - in thousands.
(See Notes to Table 27, page 222.)

Notes to Table Z?
Definitions
Average Annual Employment
The average annual employment was computed from the
quarterly average employment levels.
Annual Payroll




Average employment and annual payroll figures were
provided by the director of business planning and research.
JSC Ventures
Average employment and annual payroll data were
extracted from the Quarterly Monitoring Reports or provided
by the director of finance, except as noted below.
Lawson Furniture payroll levels for 1971 and 1973
were estimated on the basis of average employment and fringe
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